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Abstract 
The Parrot’s Voice and the Partridge’s Feathers: The Languaging of Animals and 
Animal Language in Early Indian Texts 
Andrea Lorene Gutiérrez, MA 
 The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
Supervisor:  Joel Brereton
Co-supervisor: Martha Selby 
Language about animals and the way writers “language” animals reveal a great deal 
about how humans model themselves, animals, and human-animal relations; pre-modern 
Indian literature is no different. The early poets and story writers of India transposed 
humans with animals and vice versa, usually via speaking birds. Sanskrit grammarians 
explored the question of what defines human and animal through the lens of speech, 
including bird speech. Recent research in the areas of animal studies and new materialism 
aids our understanding of these early literary forms and historical discussions from the 
subcontinent. I explore a number of Sanskrit and Pāli texts from literary, religious, and 
commentarial traditions in order to develop a new assessment of agency enacted through 
animal voice and speech. I posit that a “Brahmin-bird entanglement” has been existent 
since the Vedic period in texts and recitation practices and that Brahmins identified with 
and entangled their traditions with birds, accounting for bird names for ascetic practices, 
hymns, and Vedic lineages. Sometimes texts envisioned birds as retainers of Brahmanical 
iv 
traditions; at other times, entanglements between human and bird show how authors 
defined and differentiated religious identity. I propose a re-interpretation of authorship that 
challenges pre-existing ideas about the recitation tradition and creative acts of speech. 
Using evidence from epic, Puranic, and Buddhist literature along with grammatical debates 
and the early Sanskrit novel, I illuminate ideas concerning subjectivity, narration, and voice 
that were present in early Indian texts. 
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The Brahmin-Bird Entanglement !
Ṛgveda 2.43 “Omen-Bird” !
1. Turning toward the right the bards sing welcome—the birds speaking at their proper season, the birds
of omen. It speaks both speeches like a sāman-singer: it regulates both gāyatrī and triṣṭubh meters.
2. Like the Udgātar, o omen-bird, you sing the sāman. Like the Son of the Sacred Formulation, you re-
cite at the pressings. Like a bullish prize-winner [=stallion] when he has approached (mares) with
young, speak auspiciously to us in every way, omen-bird—speak pleasantly to us in all ways, omen-
bird.
3. When you are speaking, omen-bird, speak auspiciously: when are you sitting silently, take note of our
good thought. When as you fly up, you speak like a lute… - May we speak loftily at the ritual distrib-
ution, in possession of good heroes.1!
Ṛgvedic hymn 2.43 presents a few intriguing ideas that pertain to recent research within 
animal studies as it appears within the broader discussion of posthumanist thought.  The poet, 2
Gṛtsamada, communicates to his listeners an appreciation of speech that does not assume the typ-
ical human animal versus non-human animal distinction, namely, that human animals are capable 
of speaking, while non-human animals are not. Many thinkers have traditionally created a divide 
between these two groups based on language abilities. This hymn’s framework does not allow 
for such a notion. Not only do the śakunis (birds) speak but they speak like humans, or at least 
like udgātṛs, priests who sing the Sāmaveda. Further, the poet directly addresses a bird (“o 
omen-bird”), and the bird “speak(s) pleasantly to us,” hence there is bidirectional inter-species 
communication. Of course, one might suggest that this bird talk is really just that—bird talk—
! '1
 The Rigveda: The Earliest Religious Poetry of India, vol. 1, translated by Stephanie W. Jamison and Joel P. Brere1 -
ton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 462-463.
 Posthumanism is a mode of philosophy, ethics, and interpretation that rejects the paradigmatic humanist binary 2
divides, between body/mind, the self/other, human/animal, and organic/technological, to name a few. One of its pri-
mary tenets is the decentering of the human, a rejection of anthropocentrism. For scholars such as Cary Wolfe and 
Nina Varsava, posthumanism addresses questions of language and trans-species communication, social systems and 
their inclusions and exclusions, and a re-evaluation of humans in our environment. See Cary Wolfe, What is 
Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) and Nina Varsava, “The Problem of An-
thropomorphous Animals: Toward a Posthumanist Ethics,” Society & Animals, Brill Advance Article, 1 (2013): 1-17.
and that the poet uses similes to suggest metaphorical meaning alone. Nonetheless, he presents 
animal language in a posthumanist mode.  
A second matter is how the poet languages these animals. Languaging is a linguistic act 
that interlocutors sometimes use to distinguish animals, i.e., non-human animals, as different 
from human ones. This occurs in English with the use of pronouns such as “that,” “which,” or 
“it” to designate an animal, whereas pronouns such as “who,” “whose,” and “she/he” typically 
describe humans. The use of “it” denies an animal his or her gender and the use of “that” denies 
the animal’s “personhood.”  Fortunately, Sanskrit grammar dictates that all nouns have gender 3
(masculine, feminine, or neuter), thus words for animals necessarily indicate masculine or femi-
nine, while some mythical beings and humans can also be neuter, asexual, or hermaphroditic. In 
this hymn, the birds are masculine when the poet indicates a plural group,  but one verse does 4
not identify the singular subject at all; the translator has opted to use neuter “it” in order to leave 
the same non-specificity for the subject as in the Sanskrit poem.   5
The surprise when listening to this hymn is that the śakuni bird actually “sings the 
sāman,” thus presumably speaks utterances in human syllables and language. Although the poet 
leaves ambiguity, it is probably the bird who “regulates the gāyatrī meter” in verse one. What is 
! '2
 Donna Haraway and other scholars such as religious theorist Graham Harvey consider animals to have personhood 3
and worthy of treatment as “other-than-human-persons.” See Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008, in particular: “grammar reference books’ granting derivative personhood only 
to those animals most incorporated into (Western) humanlike sexuality and kinship,” 207, and “The personal pro-
noun who, which is necessary in this situation, has nothing to do with derivative, Western, ethnocentric, humanist 
personhood for either people or animals, but rather has to do with the query proper to serious relationships among 
significant others.” 207-208.
 In Sanskrit, the standard practice for referring to mixed plural groups that consist of female and male members is 4
to use masculine plural, as in many languages. 
 Ṛgveda 2.43.1 pada c & d. ubhé vā́ cau vadati sāmagā́  iva | gāyatráṃ ca traíṣṭubhaṃ cā́ nu rājati || The Online 5
Rigveda Metrically Restored Text, by Barend A. van Nooten and Gary B. Holland, edited online by Karen Thomson 
and Jonathan Slocum, accessed October 1, 2014, http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/lrc/RV/RV01.html#H162.
more, the bird is “like the son of the Sacred Formulation” (brahmaputra),  thus the child of 6
brahman. It is uncertain how much of the semantic value of brahman at the time of Ṛgvedic 
composition continues in the idea of Brahmin today, but one can certainly trace a historical-lin-
guistic link from the brahman in brahmaputra that the poet uses to describe this bird to the Vedic 
formulations (bráhman), to the formulators (brahmáns) and on to Brahmins.  
 Although not explicit, I argue that this poem suggests a sort of entanglement  between the 7
idea of bird and the idea of Brahmin, my primary topic of discussion. In this report I develop an 
analysis of some interspecies transpositions  between human (Brahmin) and animal (bird) exis8 -
tent in pre-modern India and I argue that language, speech, and voice played a large part in these 
transpositions. I explore how early thinkers and authors on the subcontinent negotiated inter-
species relations in regard to language and I hypothesize some possible motivations for the 
Brahmin-bird entanglement that I have identified. In order to do this, I examine how some pre-
modern South Asian authors and commentators distinguished “speech” and “voice” for the two 
groups of “human” and “animal.” I focus on a few examples of animal (in particular, bird) lan-
guage and speech for this textual tradition in relation to the humans in their environs. Finally, I 
! '3
 Ṛgveda 2.43.2 pada b. brahmaputrá 'va sávaneṣu śaṃsasi | The Online Rigveda Metrically Restored Text. While 6
the meaning of brahmaputra is uncertain, this “son of the formulation” is probably the brahmán, the formulator, the 
poet himself. 
 I take up the term from quantum physicist Karen Barad, which she used to describe the relation between subject 7
and object, as I discuss below under subheading “The Brahmin-Bird Entanglement.” Karen Barad, “Matter feels, 
converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers,” Interview with Karen Barad, Ch. 1.3 in New Materialism: Inter-
views & Cartographies, Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, Series: New Metaphysics, Open Humanities Press, 
Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2012. Accessed May 15, 2014. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/
ohp/11515701.0001.001/1:4.3/--new-materialism-interviews-cartographies?rgn=div2;view=fulltext.
 Transposition, or rather, Versetztsein, (being transposed) was the term Martin Heidegger used in his discussion of 8
the transfer of subjectivity into other, as I will discuss in the following section, “The Brahmin-Bird Entanglement.”
compare how this tradition’s understanding of animal speech stands in the light of modern-day 
posthumanist, cognitive ethologist, and new materialist perspectives on animal studies.  
 An exhaustive study of this topic for Sanskrit and Prakrit literature is not possible within 
the scope of this report. Therefore, I focus on one series of Brahmanical and Buddhist stories that 
I have grouped together due to their presenting an etiology of the Taittirīya lineage via birds; I 
contrast this group of stories with a counterpoint from the earliest Sanskrit novel, Bāṇa’s Kā-
dambarī. Then I present a brief analysis of Brahmanical ideology and ontology in relation to liv-
ing beings in order to gain philosophical insight into how to consider animals within a historical 
framework on the subcontinent. After, I analyze an unprecedented intellectual debate on the ex-
tent of animal speech within Pāṇini and Patañjali’s grammar commentaries as well as the linguis-
tic, philosophical, and religious context of this scholarly debate, of which I present an original 
translation (see Appendix B). I also incorporate a modern-day framework for analyzing this 
commentatorial literature on animal speech from the perspective of twentieth-century continental 
philosophy. Finally, I explore contributions from the area of new materialism to introduce how 
this group of thinkers offers new ways to envision interspecies relations and the story traditions 
of ancient India. I close my discussion with an examination of how the long-standing subject/ob-
ject dichotomy in western humanities might hinder our understanding of pre-modern Indian 
thought and literature, and offer a novel approach to the topic of subjectivity.  
The Brahmin-Bird Entanglement 
 From the outset I problematize the anthropocentric notions that human animals and non-
human animals belong to separate groups and that the cognitive, linguistic, or other capacities of 
the two supposed groups are mutually exclusive. Humans are, in reality, animals, and thus only 
! '4
one limited subset of the broader category of animal. Certainly there is a multiplicity of animal 
forms with differing capacities among species and individuals. It would be pointless to deny the 
richness of zoomorphs, of which the human species, anthropomorphic in nature, is but one mani-
festation, with capacities varying among individuals as well. For South Asian paradigms, includ-
ing those that involve the transmigration of souls in reincarnation theory and other rebirth theo-
ries, Fabrizio M. Ferrari and Thomas Dähnhardt suggest that “the individualization of the human 
being and the otherization of the ‘animal other’ are less definite. The construction of the body is 
more flexible. Bodies are porous entities in(to) which the essence of beings moves temporarily.”  9
Borders and groups are less rigid, and the overlap between different zoomorphic representations 
in South Asian literature can reveal information about how Sanskrit- and Prakrit-using societies 
of the past envisioned concepts such as identity and religious difference. 
 I propose to explore this porous quality within the domain that philosophers have most 
readily used to define difference in human (animal) versus (non-human) animal—speech and 
language. Early in recorded history (fourth century BCE), Aristotle considered that reason and 
the capacity for speech distinguish humans from other animals in his declaration “logon de 
monon anthrōpos echei tōn zōiōn”  (“Of all creatures, the human alone has reason/speech.”) In 10
the seventeenth century, René Descartes reasserted these rationalist humanist ideals when he 
claimed that the ability to speak separated humans from animals.  Countless other philosophers 11
! '5
 Fabrizio M. Ferrari and Thomas Dähnhardt, Introduction, Charming Beauties and Frightful Beasts: Non-Human 9
Animals in South Asian Myth, Ritual and Folklore (Bristol, CT: Equinox Publishing, Ltd., 2013), xiii.
 Adapted from Frits Staal, “Mantras and Bird Songs,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 105.3, Indological 10
Studies Dedicated to Daniel H. H. Ingalls (Jul.-Sept., 1985): 550.
 Margo DeMello, Introduction, Speaking for Animals: Animal Autobiographical Writing, ed. by Margo DeMello. 11
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 5. 
have followed suit, foremost being twentieth-century thinker Martin Heidegger.  Linguistic and 12
communicative abilities have often been the point of contention used to assert human superiority, 
and not only in the west. Therefore, I approach the study of non-human animal speech in the 
South Asian milieu using the lens of one class of animals, the avians, precisely because of their 
abilities of articulation. I choose this lens because avian examples abound in Indic literature and 
not because I prioritize speech over other points from which I might analyze a perceived dia-
lectic between human animal and non-human animal. Other valid factors for analysis beyond the 
scope of this study include consciousness, various sorts of intelligence such as geographic and 
spatial reasoning, memory, and the emotional and mental lives of beings, factors whose study is 
restricted by our human limitations.   13
 Despite Wendy Doniger’s statement that, in the Indian tradition, “there are, significantly, 
relatively few anthropomorphic stories about parrots,”  I explore a few such stories with parrot 14
speakers, as well as narratives with partridge speakers or characters. I choose these two birds be-
cause many texts use them in ways suggestive of the transposition between birds and Brahmins. 
It is curious that Sanskrit traditions so often blur or merge the identities of Brahmins and birds, 
evident even in the word dvija, meaning twice-born, referring to both birds and Brahmins or up-
! '6
 DeMello, Speaking for Animals, 5. For thinkers such as Humberto Maturana or Francisco Varela, in “In the Shad12 -
ow of Wittgenstein’s Lion,” all human activity takes place in language: “every reflection, …invariably takes place in 
language, which is our distinctive way of being human and being humanly active” in the world. But other scholars, 
in particular cognitive scientists researching brain development, animal language, and animals’ vocabulary retention 
in human languages, consider that “language arises….from fundamentally ahuman evolutionary processes of third-
order structural couplings ….among so-called higher animals,” Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, xxii. More simply, 
these scientists theorize that the evolutionary developments responsible for using words as symbols and recognizing 
and responding to such symbols occurs at an evolutionary point in history far before human cerebral developments.
 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, 46.13
 Wendy Doniger, “Zoomorphism in Ancient India: Humans More Bestial than the Beasts,” in Thinking with Ani14 -
mals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism, edited by Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 17.
per caste members of society.  If one is skeptical about this, one need only recall a character in 15
the Mahābhārata, Śuka, the parrot son of Vyāsa, who was both Brahmin and bird. Although the 
Mahābhārata does not explicitly say that Śuka is either Brahmin or bird, his father is a Brahmin, 
and he receives his sacred thread in the Śāntiparvan, thus making him at least a twice-born.  I 16
consider him to be a bird because his mother took the form of a bird before conceiving him, be-
cause his name means parrot, and because he flies on more than one occasion.  17
 Śuka is an example of interspecies transposition, an idea that Jacques Derrida develops in 
The Animal that Therefore I am. He builds on the idea of being transposed, das Versetztsein, 
shifting from one existence to another, which Martin Heidegger posited briefly in his classic 
philosophical text that almost exclusively discussed human existence, Sein und Zeit. Derrida phi-
losophizes: 
Can we transpose (versetzen) what we say about man to Dasein (=being there, existence, ex-
isting)? What does versetzen, to transpose, mean, first of all from man to man, between hu-
mans? What does one do when one transposes, an essential question for this comparative 
analysis? What is ‘transposing,’ and can we transpose in the animal? That is the whole ques-
tion of anthropomorphism, etc. Well, within this grand question, which is developed at great 
length, of the being-transposed-into-others, which he (Heidegger) characterizes as an essence 
of the human Dasein, being capable of transposing as proper to Dasein, he (Heidegger) 
writes: ‘Being transposed into others belongs to the essence of human Dasein. [Das Versetzt-
sein in Andere gehört zum Wesen des menschlichen Daseins.] As long as we keep this insight 
in view then we already possess an essential point of orientation with respect to the particular 
problem concerning the possibility of human self-transposition into the animal. But how does 
! '7
 Dvija (twice-born) in the sense of a bird stems from the fact that that bird is first “born” as an egg and then, sec15 -
ond, hatches from his shell. Dvija in the sense of Brahmin (or the top three castes, depending on the historical mo-
ment the term is used) refers to the first birth from a mother and the second birth at the time of upanāyana initiation, 
with the tying of the sūtra (sacred thread), marking the beginning of the student phase of life. 
 Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, Ch. 311, verses 18-19, taṃ mahātmā svayaṃ prītyā devyā saha mahādyutiḥ | jātamā16 -
traṃ muneḥ putraṃ vidhinopānayat tadā || 18 || tasya deveśvaraḥ śakro divyam adbhutadarśanam | dadau ka-
maṇḍaluṃ prītyā devavāsāṃsi cābhibho || 19 || Accessed Oct. 20, 2014, http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/
1_sanskr/2_epic/mbh/sas/mahabharata.htm.
 As at kailāsapṛṣṭhād utpatya sa papāta divaṃ tadā | antarikṣacaraḥ śrīmān vyāsaputraḥ suniścitaḥ || Mahābhāra17 -
ta, Śāntiparvan, Ch. 319, verse 10, and other passages. 
this really help us? Have we thereby dispelled the difficulty which besets us when we attempt 
to transpose ourselves into an animal in any given case?’  18!
If the task is so difficult, why would anyone, even a poet, attempt this transposition from Brah-
min to bird or vice versa? After all, it occurs in numerous situations, such as Brahmanical śākhā 
(lineage) names, for instance the Taittirīya (lineage from the tittiri, partridge) or the Kauśikeya 
(from kauśika, owl), and Sāmaveda hymn names like Tṛtīyakrauñca (the third crane).  I suggest 19
that Brahmins found affinities between human and bird and considered it productive or reward-
ing to explore the complexities of their relations by “transcend(ing) the confines of self and 
species.”   20
 Most theorists reckon that such ways of envisioning the self (human) and the other (ani-
mal) are ultimately self-referential or anthropocentric because we humans are hopelessly solip-
sistic.  Karla Armbruster writes: “this desire [to know the other] is sometimes almost completely 21
overshadowed by or absorbed back into the human tendency to gaze—whether lovingly or criti-
cally—at our own reflection when we look at other animals (or, more properly, to hear our own 
voices when we listen to them).”  But did Ṛgvedic poets only want to hear their own voices 22
when stating that the omen-bird “recites at the pressings” and “sings at the sāmans”? Why bring 
! '8
 Jacques Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I am, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. by Davis Wills (New York: 18
Fordham University Press, 2008), 157. The latter half of this quotation cites Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Ger-
man edition edited by Thomas Rentsch (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 209.
 Frits Staal, “Mantras and Bird Songs,” 557.19
 Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, “Introduction: The How and Why of Thinking with Animals,” Thinking with 20
Animals, 7. 
 Daston and Mitman write, “(w)hen humans imagine animals, we necessarily reimagine ourselves.” Ibid., 6. 21
 Karla Armbruster, “What Do We Want from Talking Animals? Reflections on Literary Representations of Animal 22
Voices and Minds,” in Speaking for Animals, 19. [My clarification in brackets.]
omen-birds into the matter if there already were human udgātṛs for recitation at the soma press-
ings?  
 One analogical explanation derives from some bird species’ capacities for speech mime-
sis, akin to Brahmin pundits’ abilities to memorize and reproduce lengths of texts in recitation. In 
this case, the Brahmin-bird transposition concerns a unified idea of “Brahmin/bird” as transmit-
ter of a message; tradition requires a transmitter for religious texts such as the Vedas, without 
needing a creator once the hymns, sūtras, and other liturgical texts are in existence. Dähnhardt 
has identified this resonance between humans and birds for the Indian traditions as the “capacity 
of some species to communicate their knowledge through the use of an articulate voice, singing 
sweet songs, chirping melodious tunes or even utter[ing] words pertaining to the human lan-
guage. There derives the idea that birds are indeed both sources of wisdom and transmitters of 
secret messages.”  This sort of explanation may be sufficient to justify Brahmins’ frequent 23
transposition of themselves onto or into birds. But I posit that the “zoopoetics”  present in reli24 -
gious literature and fables from the subcontinent merits more reflection. Brahmins do not simply 
talk about themselves when they transpose ideas about themselves onto birds, nor do they simply 
want to hear their own voices or project Vedically-ideal human qualities of mimicry (of which 
birds offer fine examples) back onto themselves by their use of avian names.  
 The relationship does not resolve so easily into this sort of two-directional motion. That 
is to say, one cannot reduce the phenomenon to two situations: Brahmins observe bird mimesis, 
! '9
 Thomas Dähnhardt, “Winged Messengers, Feathered Beauties and Beaks of Divine Wisdom: The Role of Birds in 23
Hindi-Urdu Allegorical Love Stories,” in Charming Beauties and Frightful Beasts, 173.
 Derrida coined this term to describe the poetics, literary criticism, and analysis of texts such as Franz Kafka’s The 24
Metamorphosis. Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I am, 6.
which they appreciate, consequently projecting their own identity onto bird identities; or, Brah-
mins do the above, but afterwards reverse the direction of motion back onto themselves, giving 
themselves bird names or identities. At times, this inter-species phenomenon might be multi-di-
rectional and complex, what I describe as a Brahmin-bird entanglement.  
 One can perceive shared activities, a symbiosis between different species, and even 
Brahmin-bird equivalence in this delightful description from Bāṇa’s Kādambarī of the hermitage 
of sages who hosted parrot chick Vaiśampāyana:  
(T)he young Brahmans were eloquent in reciting the Vedas; the parrot-race was garrulous with the prayer of oblation 
that they learnt by hearing it incessantly; the subrahmaṇya was recited by many a maina (sic); the balls of rice of-
fered to the deities were devoured by the cocks of the forest, and the offering of wild rice was eaten by the young 
kalahamsas of the tanks close by. The eating-places of the sages were protected from pollution by ashes cast round 
them. The fire for the munis' home sacrifice was fanned by the tails of their friends the peacocks....   25!
In the first portion, parrots only imitate, as theorists like Dähnhardt have described bird behavior. 
But then, the mynah assumes the Brahmin’s role in chanting, which is already a transposition. 
Further, the jungle fowl and kalahaṃsa geese, whose name indicates that they have a melodious 
or soft voice (kala), benefit in a symbiotic relationship with the Brahmanical sages: the residents 
of the hermitage fulfill their obligations and satisfy the gods with the piṇḍa ball and rice offer-
ings, and the birds receive food. As counterpoint, other birds help maintain the sacred fires, 
which benefits humans directly (and gods, indirectly). The passage tangles roles, mixes identi-
ties, and forces readers to consider bird-human relations contextually within a complex system. 
While one can call it transposition when the mynahs chant the subrahmāṇya, it is not correct to 
! '10
 The Kādambarī of Bāṇa, trans. by C. M. Ridding (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1974), 39.25
say that Bāṇa transposes or asks readers to transpose Brahmins and birds mentally. A better way 
to describe the phenomenon is what new materialist Karen Barad calls “entanglement.”   26
 The interdisciplinary turn toward new materialism does not reject earlier incarnations of 
materialism. Simplifying blatantly, new materialists work from the first principle that one cannot 
isolate matter from other components of the universe such as mind, or rather, that one cannot 
consider elements such as mind or emotion as separate from matter.  The mind is, in fact, indi27 -
visible from matter, so rationalist, humanist, dualist attempts at fashioning a dialectic such as 
mind vs. matter, reason vs. emotion, or rationality vs. animality offer extremely limited scope for 
understanding our world. New materialism as a new metaphysics encompasses research in fields 
ranging from quantum physics (Barad’s primary area) to the arts and offers new models from 
which to consider topics such as sexual differing and subjectivity. On the topic of subject and 
object, or human “subject” and non-human “other,” Barad explains, “(i)nstead of there being a 
separation of subject and object, there is an entanglement of subject and object.”  28
 Bāṇa plays with this throughout Kādambarī by injecting subjectivity as well as object-
hood into the parrot narrator, Vaiśampāyana. Critics might argue that a simple narrator does not 
have much subjectivity in an account. After all, dualists say, narration is recounting an event, 
typically an event that is the experience of others, and it does not require much agency or deter-
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mination. Seen this way, the process of narration is akin to recitation, imitation, or mimesis. But 
Vaiśampāyana, while a narrator, is one of various protagonists of his own sub-narrative that oc-
cupies the vast majority of the novel; in addition, he is a primary actor in the macro-narrative 
surrounding the story that he tells. Parrot Vaiśampāyana shares his own life story, his autobiogra-
phy, describing the destruction of his family and home and his adventures in finding a new home 
with sage Jābāli and ascetics. The bird also involves himself through speech and act in other 
episodes of the story that he tells. Finally, the macro-narrative concerning the Caṇḍāla princess, 
the king, and others also involves Vaiśampāyana. It is in this macro-narrative frame story where 
the parrot appears before the king to tell his story.  
 The plot is so convoluted it requires a synopsis here. In the larger tale, Vaiśampāyana was 
born as a parrot as a result of his (human) father’s curse. In a past life, Vaiśampāyana was really 
a human sage, Puṇḍarīka, who had fallen in love with Mahāśvetā in a dual love story that is the 
macro-narrative. After being reborn as a bird, he can only attain release from this curse upon 
completion of a lengthy series of ascetic performances and after revealing the king’s true identity 
to him (the king was also a separated lover in his past life, the second part of the dual love story). 
After the bird’s revelation, which is his sub-narrative, both couples reunite in their love, or rather, 
they do in their next lives. The parrot, as parrot and not human, is an actor in all three encapsu-
lated stories, in his own micro-autobiography, in the sub-narrative he tells throughout most of the 
book, and in the larger frame story.  
 This description supports my argument proposing the parrot’s subjectivity, despite his 
being a narrator, but the parrot is also an object. The Caṇḍāla girl brings him before the king pur-
portedly for entertainment and delight, he is the recipient of the curse, and the Śabara leader ab-
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jectly ignores him in an episode to which I will return later. Ultimately, he is not the main charac-
ter (Kādambarī is), hence most things happen around him and not to or because of him, granting 
him “wall-flower” status for much of the lengthy work. Varying the degrees of subjectivity and 
objecthood, Bāṇa writes subjectivity into his novel as rather more entangled than a purely dualis-
tic subject/object dichotomy. For compositions like this, Barad’s discussion of agency and being 
an actor is enlightening: “agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring en-
tanglements. So agency does not involve choice in any liberal humanist sense; rather, it is about 
the possibilities and accountability entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses 
of bodily production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by 
those practices.”  Barad’s discourse is complex, so I will trace her ideas and lexicon using the 29
character of Vaiśampāyana and the “parrot-race” more broadly, as Bāṇa presents them. 
 Vaiśampāyana enacts his involvement, although he rarely chooses what he does in the 
narrative; he is more of a victim of fate at Bāṇa’s whim. As Barad signals, deterministic choice is 
not necessary for agency, which traditional thinkers envision as causing actions and reactions. 
Vaiśampāyana’s material-discursive apparatuses include his story-telling abilities that are key 
in reuniting lovers and his discourse in itself, which in this case makes the characters remember 
their lost loves and initiates their transcendence into the next life reunited. His apparatuses also 
include a few more purely material elements, of which his organs of speech are the most remark-
able for my discussion. His voice, determined by structures of a material nature, is crucial to his 
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ability in song and to the sweetness of his intonation in poetry recitation and so on.  According 30
to Barad, the parrot has agency in his enactment (or performance) of song and story-telling due 
to the material-discursive apparatuses he has available, as produced by and in his body.  
 While Vaiśampāyana has a larger role in the book, my earlier example of the “parrot-
race” can illustrate the same ideas from Barad. Bāṇa writes that the parrots recited a prayer “that 
they learnt by hearing it incessantly.” For Barad and other new materialist thinkers, it is almost 
irrelevant if the parrots choose to recite or simply imitate Brahmin priests because of their nature. 
Their recitation is a practice that they articulate through bodily productions, using the mater-
ial-discursive apparatuses they have available. Thus, as Barad theorizes and I argue, they are 
agents of their recitations.  
 In effect, a Brahmin priest typically carries out the same expression: the recitation of 
prayers is a repetitive practice articulated through bodily productions, including chanting, 
gesturing of hands, and bodily movement. Brahmanical ritual is indeed a fine example of an en-
actment that articulates boundaries as well as excludes certain spaces, objects, and people 
from that practice. Thus, the transposition from Brahmin to bird in Vaiśampāyana’s rebirth from 
his past life as human Puṇḍarīka might not be such a stretch, nor would the opposite, from bird, 
as member of the “parrot-race” or as Vedic śakuni, to Brahmanical reciter. Nor is it so difficult to 
conceive of Brahmin-bird entanglements like the Mahābhārata’s Śuka (is he a Brahmin-bird or 
bird who is Brahmin?). In fact, I suggest that Brahmin-bird entanglements reach such an extent 
that certain areas of Brahmanical identity may have become fused with avian notions, particular-
ly evident in Brahmanical, Vedic, and sages’ names. 
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What’s in a Name? 
 A whole range of Brahmanical ascetic denominations derive from animal names. Such 
categorical names must have originated largely as metaphorical epithets for ascetics, but reflect 
the practices that animals perform using their material-discursive apparatuses of bodily produc-
tion. These ascetics also purportedly practiced these same enactments, explaining the carry-over 
of names. Such names for bird-Brahmins include paramahaṃsa, a “goose” sort of holy person 
who is discriminating to the highest degree and kāpotī or kāpotā, a term for a hermit or holy 
householder who gleaned cereals using only two fingers like a beak, eating each grain individu-
ally as a pigeon would.   31
 There are more bird names in Sāmavedic hymns, such as the Vāṅnidhanakrauñca Sāman, 
“a krauñca (crane) melody ‘ending in speech,’” according to Frits Staal, as well as the plava (an 
acquatic bird) sāman, the vāśa (a noisy bird) sāman, and the bhāsa (a bird of prey) sāman.  32
Vedic associations with birds occur, further, in modern performances of the atirātra rite, for 
which Brahmins prepare the agnicayana vedi (altar) in the shape of a bird, probably a śyena, the 
falcon associated with soma.   33
 The entanglement has yet more knots, however, as some Vedic lineages have appropriat-
ed avian associations for their śākhā (branch) names. Taittirīya is a case in point. Taittirīya is an 
adjectival derivative (a taddhita formed with vṛddhi) from the base word tittiri, a Sanskrit word 
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for partridge. Opinions concerning the origins of this lineage’s name have aired over the millen-
nia. In fact, the etiology of the name for this Brahmanical clan and set of texts has resulted in 
various rich tales concerning many tittiris or one tittira (in Pāli), which I analyze below.  
 Pāṇini voices possibly the earliest (ca. fourth century BCE) extant opinion regarding the 
name and origin of Taittirīya in his sūtra 4.3.102, which specifies that the chaṇ affix (-ya) carries 
the meaning of “proclaimed by X,” for taittirīya and similar words and clarifies that the Tait-
tirīyas are “those who learn the Veda enounced by Tittiri [partridge or person with name Par-
tridge].”  This sūtra occurs immediately after Pāṇini sūtra 4.3.101 explaining the general rule 34
for the -īya taddhita pratyaya (suffix), confirming that the suffix is for someone who studies the 
text proclaimed by Tittiri and not someone descended from Tittiri (a hypothetical person).  This 35
indicates that at least at the time of Pāṇini, tradition held that the Taittirīyas did not have this 
name because of some historical figure or clan leader named Tittiri. Pāṇini makes clear that this 
was not a patronymic.  These texts for study and recitation are simply named after a bird, no 36
more and no less. Taittirīya is a textual designation and not an ethnic or familial one. In the twen-
tieth century, D. D. Kosambi suggested Taittirīya was a totemic clan name with the partridge as 
the clan’s emblem.  This idea does not agree with what Pāṇini expresses in the grammar tradi37 -
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tion, but there does not seem to be any actual evidence to reject Kosambi’s interpretation out-
right. 
 Another explanation of the Taittirīyas’ name appears in the Anukramaṇī of the Black Ya-
jus, which informs that “Vaiśampāyana taught it to Yāska, who taught it to Taittiri, who became a 
teacher.”  In this etiology, the derivative (Taittirīya) apparently forms from a teacher named 38
Taittiri (thus already a vṛddhi derived from tittiri, partridge) and not from a person or animal 
named Tittiri. This theory does not disagree with the Paninian grammar tradition, but the 
Anukramaṇī does not change matters much, because a teacher named Taittiri got his name from a 
partridge in the first place.  
 Taittirīyakas, those belonging to the Taittirīya lineage, had and have their own interpreta-
tions, and certainly treat both the textual tradition and lineage as clan-based. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara 
Miśra, a ca. twelfth-century CE commentator of the whole Taittirīya branch including Āraṇyaka, 
Veda, and Upaniṣad, is likely to have belonged to the clan himself. He claims that this Veda was 
seen by the muni Tittiri and his family.  According to this commentator, the Taittirīya textual 39
school would have taken this sage Tittiri as an ancestor for the lineage. Hence by medieval times, 
the tradition has acquired some ethnic or ancestral associations for its name’s origins. Further, 
this etiology has now distanced itself from Pāṇini’s non-patronymic definition for Taittirīya. 
 There are two further stories that resonate with the Puranic partridge Taittirīya tales that I 
will present immediately below. One version from the Mahābhārata is not an etiological tale for 
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the partridge (tittiri) at all, but has similarities to all of the other stories in my discussion. The 
other is a Pāli canon Jātaka story, the Tittirajātaka. This tale also shares enough affinity with the 
Puranic Taittirīya partridge stories for inclusion here, which is surprising since it is Buddhist and 
not a Brahmanical story. Commonalities to consider in these tales, while not appearing in every 
story variant, include 1.) names (Vaiśampāyana), 2.) a Heideggerian or Derridean transposition 
from human to bird, 3.) the physical regurgitation of Vedic texts, and 4.) the notion of either par-
tridge or parrot retaining or salvaging pieces of knowledge, through which the tradition in ques-
tion is able to continue and flourish.  
Etiological Story Cousins !
A.) Viṣṇu Purāṇa 
  
 I call all of these stories etiologies: explanations of why things are the way they are or 
why something has the name it has. But from the perspective of the Puranic tradition, these sto-
ries are also euhemerisms, interpretations of myth as traditional accounts of historical persons 
and events. Viewed within the tradition, these stories, like much of the Purāṇas, are also histori-
ography. In all excerpts, I have used bold text for words or phrases of particular importance for 
my analysis (appearing in the following section), and I have made clarifications in parentheses. 
!
…It had been formerly agreed by the Munis, that any one of them who, at a certain time, did 
not join an assembly held on mount Meru should incur the guilt of killing a Brāhmaṇa, with-
in a period of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana (the guru) alone failed to keep the appointment 
(the meeting on Mount Meru) and consequently killed, by an accidental kick with his foot, 
the child of his sister. He then addressed his scholars (students) and desired them to perform 
the penance expiatory of Brahmanicide on his behalf. Without any hesitation Yājñavalkya 
refused and said, ‘How shall I engage in penance with these miserable and inefficient 
Brāhmaṇas (Brahmins)?’ On which his Guru, being incensed, commanded him to relinquish 
all that he had learnt from him. ‘You speak contemptuously,’ he observed ‘of these young 
Brāhmaṇas, but of what use is a disciple who disobeys my commands?’   !
‘I spoke,’ replied Yājñavalkya, ‘in perfect faith; but as to what I have read (learnt) from you, I 
have had enough: it is no more than this’— [acting as if he would eject it from his stomach]; 
when he brought up the texts of the Yajuṣ in substance stained with blood. He then depart-
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ed. The other scholars (students) of Vaiśampāyana, transforming themselves to partridges 
(tittiri), picked up the texts which he had disgorged and which from that circumstance were 
called Taittirīya; and the disciples were called the Caraka professors of the Yajuṣ, from 
Caraṇa, ‘going through’ or ‘performing’ the expiatory rites enjoined by their master…  40!
B.) Bhāgavata Purāṇa !
 This etiology remarks especially on one feature of the transmission of this part of the 
Vedas—the Taittirīya portions—namely, that these are beautiful, supeṡalāḥ. This suggests to me 
that the Taittirīya is beautiful because it is like birdsong or because of its avian nature. Michel 
Angot also comments on the especially lyrical and beautiful quality of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 
above and beyond that which is typical of a philosophical text like an Upaniṣad. In his analysis 
of this work, Angot emphasizes the lyrical and songlike aspect of the Taittirīya, an aspect that 
does not receive much attention as the traditional priority typically is to analyze the text’s Vedan-
tic philosophical content.   41
It is traditionally reported that Vaiśampāyana had pupils called Carakādvaryus. For the sake 
of their preceptor, they performed a penance in expiation of the sin of Brahmahatyā (killing 
a Brāhmaṇa).  
One of his disciples, Yājñavalkya, remarked (to Vaiśampāyana), ‘O worshipful Sir, what 
amount of reward can be gained through the poor performance of penance by these weak-
lings? I alone can undergo such austere penance as will be extremely difficult for others to 
perform.’  
When [boastfully] addressed thus, the preceptor (Vaiśampāyana) got offended. He [perempto-
rily] ordered, ‘Get out. Enough of a pupil like you who contemptuously speak of Brāhmaṇa 
sages. Give up at once whatever you have learnt from me.’  
Thereupon, the son of Devarāta (Yājñavalkya) on his part immediately vomited out the col-
lection of Yajurveda passages and left the place. And the sages saw the collection of the Ya-
jurveda texts.  
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ka || 8 || nistejaso vadasyenān yastvaṃ brāhmaṇapuṅgavān | tena śiṣyeṇa nārtho ‘sti mamājñābhaṅgakāriṇā || 9 || 
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hatyāvrataṃ cīrṇaṃ guruṇā coditaistu yaiḥ | carakādhvaryavaste tu caraṇānmunisattam || 13 || 
 See in particular Taittirīya-upaniṣad, Angot, part D, “Cantilation et tonalité,” 231-292.41
(T)he sages were so enamored of it they assumed the form of Tittira birds [francoline par-
tridges] and collected it. Hence the beautiful (supeṡalāḥ) branches of the Yajurveda came to 
be known as Taiitirīyas.  42!
C.) Mahābhārata excerpt  !
 This tale makes use of a trope involving the bird that is frequent in both Brahmanical and 
Buddhist traditions—the metaphor of the release from fetters and of rebirth, which I discuss in 
the following section as well. It is not surprising that a bird is the emblem of release here, as this 
portion of the Mahābhārata is the section on the dharma of final release (the mokṣadharma sec-
tion of the Śāntiparvan [book 12:168-353]). 
!
Vyāsa performed intense austerities and petitioned Śiva on the peak of Mount Meru for a 
son; Śiva granted his wish, promising him a son who would be as pure as the elements, and 
who would win fame for his spiritual accomplishments. After obtaining this boon, Vyāsa was 
one day rubbing two firesticks when the Apsaras Ghṛtācī appeared; her beauty aroused uncon-
trollable desire in him. Taking the form of a female parrot, she approached him as he tried to 
make fire, and his seed gushed forth and fell on one of the firesticks. As he continued to rub, 
Śuka (= Parrot) was born from that stick, blazing bright like a sacrificial fire. Gaṅgā came in 
her own form to Meru’s peak to bathe him; all the celestials came, and Śiva invested him 
with the sacred thread. The Vedas presented themselves to him as soon as he was born, and 
he chose Bṛhaspati to be his guru. Taking no interest in the first three stages of life, he direct-
ed his mind towards release…  !
Śuka returned to his father’s hermitage there, travelling through the air, radiant as the sun, and 
told Vyāsa what Janaka had said. He then joined Vyāsa’s four existing disciples. Once these 
five appealed to Vyāsa to take no sixth disciple, and to let the dissemination of the Veda be 
their task… Vyāsa remained with his son, meditating in silence. Nārada saw him there; he 
complained that the sound of the Vedas was no longer heard, and told him he should re-
sume recitation. Vyāsa now recited with his son. One day a terrible wind began to blow, 
and Vyāsa told his son to stop reciting; he explained that the wind was a portent indicat-
ing that the recitation should cease,… Śuka considered how he might avoid attachment and 
rebirth, and resolved to make use of Yoga to abandon his body and enter the Sun. He flew up 
from the mountain-top into the sky; all creatures beheld him traveling towards the Sun with 
fully focused mind, and the seers and celestials praised him greatly.   43
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 Mahābhārata, abridged and translated by John D. Smith (New York: Penguin Classics, 2009), Śantiparvan 43
(12.311-319), 658-9.
D.) Tittirajātaka (“Partridge Pundit’s Tale”) !
 While this story appears in the Buddhist context of the Pāli Jātaka tales, it contains the 
skeletal framework of the Brahmanical tale from above. Scholars of Buddhist literature consider 
that the verse portions of the Jātakas are the earliest layer of Buddhist canonical material con-
tained in the Jātakas, and that the narrator(s) later attached the prose sections that ultimately be-
came fixed or canonical.  Richard Salomon and Timothy Lenz theorize that this process of 44
building from a skeleton was at work for much early Indic literature, in which verse portions of 
texts are skeletons that serve as mnemonic devices around which to embellish larger stories in 
oral narration.  In this sort of oral process, early verses are generally preserved intact, while the 45
larger prose story may vary over time with different narrators. In the portion of the story in ques-
tion, a partridge instructs young Brahmin boys; one could imagine such a narrative to pre-exist 
the Buddhist narration. After all, virtually all of the Jātakas contain narration in the present (pac-
cuppannavatthu) and then the embedded “story of the past” (atītavatthu).  On occasion, the sto46 -
ries resonate with the literary history of the Mahābhārata or the Rāmāyaṇa, so Buddhist compil-
ers evidently sourced earlier material from the Brahmanical tradition. Yet, what one might imag-
ine to be the earlier portion of this story, which is overtly Brahmanical in content, has no verse. 
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Unexpectedly, the latter portion of the tale, in which the partridge teaches the dhamma to the lion 
and tiger, is more Buddhist in tone and contains all the verses.  
 Following the standard scholarly interpretation of textual history, then, the latter portion 
of this story, containing the verse and strongly Buddhist in morals, would still pertain to the ear-
lier stratum of Jātaka material when conceiving of the corpus more broadly. Interestingly, the 
final verses closing the tale do retain the narrative elements of the partridge and his violent end 
from the first half of the story, so there is cohesion from beginning to end. The fact that the vers-
es maintain the same story trend as the prose portions do indicates that the tale might retain simi-
lar form and content from its earliest times as part of the Pāli corpus. Otherwise, if the prose nar-
rative had transformed over time from an earlier period of recitation, one would not expect to see 
so much continuity between the verses and the prose, especially since some of the narrative con-
tent had a vastly different source (Brahmanical). An attempt at attributing some material to an 
earlier stratum than other material is not solely for the purpose of determining “Which came 
first? The Brahmin or the Buddhist (story)?” It can be a valuable method to locate, contextualize, 
and align story traditions in Indian literary history, a discipline in which chronology is uncertain 
and accurate dating often perilous or impossible.  
 When reading, it is also noteworthy that this Buddhist tale presents a critique of the 
Brahmin boys as “snivelly.” At first glance, this seems to be another element of Buddhist satiri-
cal humor present in the Jātakas that I discuss below as well as a particularly Brahmanical cri-
tique. However, a similar comment appears in both Puranic versions, where one would not ex-
pect to find such criticism (cf. “these miserable and inefficient Brāhmaṇas” [Viṣṇu Purāṇa] and 
“the poor performance of penance by these weaklings” [Bhāgavata Purāṇa]). Finally, while this 
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tale seems to me to refer to the Taittirīya etiology, Ernst Windisch wrote in passing that this story 
made one recall the Maitrāyaṇīya school of the black Yajurveda, which had a close relationship 
with Buddhism.   47
“Partridge Pundit’s Tale” (my translation, see Appendix A for Pāli text) !
A long time ago, when Brahmadatta was ruling in Benares, there was a teacher who was fa-
mous all the world around teaching the art of knowledge to five hundred young Brahmin men,
(….) 
….There also was a partridge living there as his permanent dwelling. This partridge, having 
heard the teacher teach all the men to recite the mantras, had grasped all of the three Vedas. 
The men became very friendly with this (bird). 
After a while, the teacher’s time had come, even though the young men had not really ob-
tained perfect completion (of their Vedic study). The young men incinerated the teacher’s 
corpse, prepared a stūpa of sand, revered (him) with a bounty of flower blossoms, and wept 
and lamented.  
Now then, Partridge asked them: “Why do you all cry so?” They said, “Our teacher died 
when our (śāstric) knowledge was still not completed! That’s why we cry!”   
“Do not worry (your) peace of mind like this! I will teach you to recite this śāstric art.” 
“How do you know it?” 
“I listened when the teacher was instructing you. Just so I have learnt the three Vedas fully by 
heart.” 
“Then please do teach us the full knowledge yourself!” 
Partridge said, “Then do listen.” He expounded to them (on the Veda) like one releasing a 
river from the summit of a mountain, even the bits which were gnarly and knotty (in difficul-
ty). 
The young men became thrilled and delighted in the presence of Partridge Pundit and pro-
gressed in their śāstric art. 
What’s more, this partridge then stood as a teacher who was famous in the four corners (of the 
world) as he taught (this) art to them.  
The young men made for him a beautiful cage and they tied it with stretched canopies on top. 
They offered him sweet grain and such things on a beautiful salver. They revered him with 
blossoms of every color (and) they paid (him) great honor. 
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So they say that the partridge recited the mantras to five hundred young men striving (to 
learn) in the forest; and this became well-known on the whole isle of Jambu (India)….  48
The tale continues with a bad ascetic (duṭṭhatāpasa = duḥsthatāpasa [Skt.]) killing, roasting, and 
eating Partridge Pundit. Through Partridge’s friend the Lizard, the Lion and Tiger, two non-hu-
man disciples of the partridge, come to learn of the partridge’s murder. After a sort of trial, with 
the evidence of the dead partridge’s feathers in the bad ascetic’s dreadlocks (tassa jāṭantare titti-
rapaṇḍitassa lomāni paññāyanti),  the felines convict the murderer and kill him for his evil 49
deed. 
Common Traces, Common Shadows !
 The multiplicity of common elements in these stories suggests conversations and allu-
sions within the same tradition and between Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions. The name 
Vaiśampāyana appears in every rendition except the Buddhist version. The bird in the Mahāb-
hārata is not Vaiśampāyana (Śuka is the bird), but another principal narrator of the Mahābhārata 
in fact has the same name. Vaiśampāyana reappears as well in Kādambarī as both parrot and nar-
rator. All of these stories except the Mahābhārata contain criticism of penance, tapas, asceti-
cism, and the like, and in particular they critique the performance of these practices by inept 
practitioners or deliberately malicious ascetics. In the latter part of each episode, this contrasts 
with the bird or birds’ fine assimilation and recitation of the sacred texts, except for the Jātaka, 
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which, reversing the trend, begins with the bird’s fine recitation of sacred texts and closes with 
the critique of the ascetic’s poor religious observances.  
 Why is a bird, either partridge or parrot, the narrator or reciter of these texts? Birds such 
as the parrot have been valued in pre-modern Indian textual traditions due to their capacity for 
mimesis, their ability to articulate in human languages, and their cognitive grasp of syntax and 
other complex aspects of language, such as correct usage of verbal conjugations using past, 
present, and future tense.  I have also discussed why and how mimicry and correct repetition 50
were such value-laden qualities in religious contexts that preserved their most important texts via 
oral transmission. These abilities and values certainly explain the prominence of the parrot in In-
dian literature, evident here in the examples from the Mahābhārata and Kādambarī, or else-
where in the case of parrot Śuka who narrates the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.  
 An explanation for the partridge’s prominence is harder to theorize, but I hypothesize this 
bird's selection for the Taittirīya texts in part because this subfamily of aves has a particularly 
melodic, piercing call and a variety of calls in regular use.  In addition to vocal capacities, the 51
partridge is a low-standing ground fowl and thus ideal for picking up bits of food from the 
ground (or collecting pieces of a text) with his or her beak. Moreover, this bird’s habitat—plains, 
open cultivated fields, and areas with low trees and scrub—puts the animal in closer contact with 
humans than other birds, such as those living in jungle canopies. This means that humans can 
observe how partridges, a ground-nesting subfamily, feed their young more easily than we can 
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with birds of prey or small avians that nest high in trees. Swallowing something up and regurgi-
tating on demand for offsprings’ survival is a bodily practice of many birds, but it is one we ob-
serve best at eye or ground level.  
 Thus, humans on the subcontinent may have analogized this bird’s food consumption be-
haviors to human textual assimilation, as well as the reverse process, linking the regurgitation of 
food to the recitation and teaching of texts. Within a cultural milieu that highly valued the oral 
assimilation of works and rightfully feared any potential detriment to the retention of texts or to 
the reciters, the partridge’s bodily practices were desirable. Earlier I noted the renunciate tradi-
tion’s analogy of avian food consumptive practices to ideal human religious practices in my dis-
cussion of the kapotā (pigeon) ascetics. Therefore, the observation of avian behavior with regard 
to food and the extrapolation of avian dietary bodily practices to religion already has a precedent 
in Indian contexts.   
 I posit that an underlying inspiration for and theme of these stories, regardless of the links 
to the Taittirīya lineage, may have been the fear of potentially losing reciters who were valuable 
members of society. This extends to anxieties over potential ruptures in the textual or recitation 
tradition. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa directly references this anxiety in the passage that directly follows 
the excerpt above: “Yājñavalkya, (was) …anxious to recover possession of the texts of the Ya-
juṣ…”  Other stories hint at anxiety or rupture via the mention of Brahmanicide (brahmahatyā) 52
(in both the Viṣṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas), the guru’s fault in missing an important meeting 
(Viṣṇu Purāṇa), and the death of the guru, potentially marking a break in the tradition (Tittirajā-
taka). In the Mahābhārata story, the break in recitation is due to an inauspicious wind, so it is a 
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deliberate rupture in recitation that dharmaśāstra ordains, but even before this break, Nārada is 
nervous because of the silence and lack of chanting.  
 No matter what the rupture’s source is in each instance, the composers of these stories 
imagine birds as agents who retain and save pieces of knowledge and subsequently preserve the 
lineage. Using Barad’s revised notion of agency, the bodily practices of these birds literally in-
volve material or mechanical apparatuses but reformulate themselves in metaphorical discursive 
apparatuses for the regurgitation of tracts of text. Each of the etiological stories confers agency to 
the bird. The animal’s bodily production drives the agency, not the choice or deliberation that 
humanists typically ascribe to agency. This bodily production also occurs as a result of a transpo-
sition from human animal to non-human animal, at least in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa’s story, where the 
students transform themselves into partridges. In the Jātaka story, this sort of species shifting 
appears to be simply a narrative transposition of the role of human guru into partridge pundit 
without involving a metaphysical species shift. However, there is some suggestion that the par-
tridge pundit either transposes into human form in the latter half of the story or may not be so 
bird-like throughout the entirety of the tale, implied in the narrator’s curious lexical way of de-
scribing the partridge’s “feathers.” These “feathers” found in the ascetic’s dreadlocks and incrim-
inating his guilt are lomāni (stem loma),  a word that typically indicates hair and not feathers at 53
all. The usual Pāli words for feather, patta, piccha, piñcha, and piñja, do all appear in other Jāta-
ka stories,  so this word choice, which usually describes something mammalian if not human, is 54
strange proof of the ascetic’s slaughter of Tittira Pundit. The first part of the story certainly iden-
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tifies the partridge as a partridge—the Brahmin students gift him a gold cage and sweet grain—
but the more mammalian attributes in the second half of the tale might imply species blurring, if 
not transposition.  
 In fiction, “the difficulty which besets us when we attempt to transpose ourselves into an 
animal,”  as Heidegger envisioned it, is not so difficult at all. In Kādambarī, the transposition 55
from human to animal and again into human occurs via a curse and rebirth; Puṇḍarīka (human) is 
reborn as Vaiśampāyana (parrot) and likewise, Vaiśampāyana reunites with his love in his next 
human birth. Beyond stories but still within the Brahmanical ideology of reincarnation, this also 
presents little difficulty. However, one can discern a paradigm shift separating the earlier, imagi-
native story tradition that embraces this transposition and the later (medieval and post-medieval) 
Taittirīya lineage, which might find such species shifting inconsistent or implausible. Hence, the 
later tradition attempts to resolve the transposition by explaining Tittiri as the name of the human 
muni who saw this portion of the Veda, according to Puranic tradition and the Anukramanī, or by 
explaining Taittiri as a human preceptor, as per the medieval commentarial tradition following 
Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara. Such a paradigm shift takes the animal out of the story. These groups, in line 
with Heidegger, struggle to explain the animal-human entanglement already established by this 
time in a way that is satisfactory for their needs and meanings.  
Bird as Brahmin: Bird as Self, Bird as Other 
 Some traditions, however, could accept the entanglement and in fact promoted it in their 
texts. Bāṇabhaṭṭa embraced this entanglement and used it as a vehicle for humor, as in the pas-
sage in which the peacock friends fan the sacrificial fires and the mynahs sing the subrahmaṇya. 
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For Bāṇa, the shared activities of Brahmins and birds reflect their common valuation. Further, he 
recognized the traditional Vedic and Brahmanical reliance on bird metaphors and played it out to 
comic expression. He deliberately juxtaposed animal with human to highlight commonalities, 
and that made his story better. 
 The Buddhist Jātaka account of the bird as a Brahmin teacher is much more complex. 
Presumably a Brahmin-bird entanglement was already in place for this story tradition when the 
Buddhist appropriation of the tale occurred, and the Buddhist narrator simply retained this ele-
ment. Oskar von Hinüber has discussed the Buddhist adoption of Brahmanical narratives into the 
Jātaka collection, although these narratives, for example from the Mahābhārata and the 
Rāmāyaṇa, more typically re-appear in Jātaka verses.  This pattern does not seem to apply to 56
the Tittirajātaka. The verses in the Tittira tale concern the culpability of the bad ascetic and the 
partridge’s absence and death. The verses contain none of the story of the partridge taking up 
teaching after the human guru’s death, the portion ostensibly modified from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa or 
from a similar tale rendition. This partridge-as-preceptor narrative appears in the first half of the 
Tittirajātaka, which is entirely in prose.  
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 Despite this incongruity with the standard appearance of appropriated elements in the Jā-
takas, this tale pertains to the earlier story tradition of these tales, following von Hinüber’s theory 
of the corpus’s formation. In this story, the Buddha does not tell the verses, nor does he overtly 
participate in the narrative, as in the later Jātakas.  Only the final commentary, the samodhāna 57
that connects the past story to Buddhist teachings, states that Partridge Pundit was one of the past 
lives of the Buddha. With this I establish that some elements of the Tittira story are pre-Buddhist 
and that the extant Pāli canon telling of this story is certainly early in comparison with the Jātaka 
corpus as a whole. However, the tale is exceptional in that its verses neither fit the expected pat-
tern of stories that appropriate Brahmanical content in verse form nor the later pattern of the 
Buddha speaking the verses.  
Bird as Brahmin, Bird as Religious Other: Appropriation and Assimilation 
 Although Buddhist compositional questions complicate matters, the tale clearly embraces 
the transposition of Brahmin into bird, and for various purposes, it seems. First and foremost is 
the appropriation of this tale for Buddhist doctrinal purposes. The samodhāna commentary that 
closes the story states that the Partridge Pundit who was teaching the Vedas to the Brahmin boys 
was really the Buddha in one of his past lives.  Thus the Brahmin, usually human but here a 58
bird, is in actual fact the Buddha and not only Brahmanical as listeners might expect while hear-
ing the story. This is a strategic literary device familiar from other works of Buddhist conversion 
literature such as the Buddhacarita, in which Prince Siddhārtha grows up in Brahmanical envi-
rons surpassed by the advances of later Buddhist developments. These texts imply that younger 
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and later means superior, as Patrick Olivelle argues in explaining the presence of Brahmanical 
story references embedded in the Life of the Buddha.  In “Partridge Pundit’s Story,” the par59 -
tridge’s teaching of the Veda conveniently shifts in the second half of the story into the par-
tridge’s teaching of the dhamma to the lion and tiger. Thus, the story subtly deploys Buddhism as 
a replacement superior to Brahmanism. Finally, the story’s samodhāna adds that the partridge 
was, in fact, the Buddha(-to-be) the whole time, suggesting that the Buddha embodies all earlier 
Brahmanical teachings via appropriation before advancing his more evolved teachings. Curious-
ly, the partridge teaches Brahmanical studies to humans (the māṇavā, Brahmin youth), but teach-
es Buddhist dhamma to animals.   60
 Eventually, long after the story ends, the partridge is reborn as the Buddha, which means 
that this story implies at least two overt interspecies transpositions, plus the uncertain species 
blurring suggested by the partridge’s loma (hair, feathers, or skin). In the first transposition, the 
guru shifts from human form into partridge, and at the end of all the Jātakas, the partridge re-
turns to earth as the Buddha, a human. But for the purposes of the Buddhist conversion tale, the 
transpositions are really from “inferior” Brahmanical teachings into Buddhist teachings and from 
“inferior” animal form into final human form as the Buddha, perfected after so many births.  
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 This ultimate shift from animal into (super)human interestingly aligns with Derrida’s ex-
ploration of rationalist ideas of human evolutionary advancement beyond animals: “In all cases, 
if I am (following) after it, the animal therefore comes before me, earlier than me (früher is 
Kant’s word regarding the animal…). … And also, therefore, since it is before me, it is behind 
me.”  Derrida expands this notion but ultimately rejects Kant’s evaluation. This sort of rejection 61
is not present, however, in Buddhist ideology. The Jātakas present the past lives of the Buddha 
as largely animal in embodiment as the Buddha-to-be was developing his perfection. The final 
thesis of these texts is that Buddhism is an evolutionarily more perfect religion than Brahman-
ism, just as they suggest humans and superhumans are more perfect than (non-human) animals.  
 An exploration of this story and its presentation of alterity does not end with the voice 
and doctrine of Buddhism surpassing the partridge’s Brahmin identity and voice. Animal and 
human characters interact and conflict with each other in many ways, resulting in multiple 
strands of interspecies conversations and inter-religious comments. As I explained above, this 
occurs in one conversational strand with the character of Tittira himself as the embodiment of the 
animal other and the religious other. In this Buddhist story, the partridge, largely presented as a 
Brahmin teaching other Brahmins, meets his death in a narrative divergence from the Brahmani-
cal Purāṇas. This may have been a humorous allusion for listeners who knew the tale’s other 
versions. The killing of the partridge is a sort of Brahmanicide (brahmahatyā), an element that 
did appear in both Puranic narratives, although in those stories the gurus committed brahma-
hatyā; it was not enacted upon them. Thus the Buddhist narrative (or narrator) commits Brah-
manicide and kills the religious other (Partridge Pundit) after already having done the same with 
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the earlier Vedic teacher. This caricature also transforms the Brahmanical sin of Brahmanicide 
into a Buddhist evil, hiṃsā, here, violence toward animals. This satirical device would have been 
humorous for Buddhist listeners in its appropriation of Brahmanical content, but would also have 
been useful for teaching Buddhist doctrine through its subtle assimilation of Brahmanical con-
tent. This mirrors the same process of appropriation and assimilation of Partridge Pundit’s Brah-
min identity into the Buddha’s identity. Ultimately, this single tale illustrates that the process at 
work on the macro level throughout many Jātakas—incorporating content from the Mahābhāra-
ta and the Rāmāyaṇa into the Theravāda Suttapiṭaka—also occurs in micro instances using 
Brahmanical texts beyond those epics discussed by von Hinüber. 
Other than Other 
 All of these facets—the transposition from one to another, appropriation, and assimila-
tion—suggest that perhaps alterity and othering are not the best terms to describe this phe-
nomenon, although these are the terms which post-modernist discourse most commonly uses. 
Religious theorist Jonathan Z. Smith coined the term “proximate other” to describe a member of 
a different religion in close proximity to someone of another religion.  Claire Maes, in her work 62
on the Buddhist Pāli Vinaya, has added that this proximate other, spatially proximate and theoret-
ically proximate to the religious tradition of focus, might also be theodoxically proximate and 
practically proximate in the sense of having very proximate praxes.  This applies to individuals 63
such as the wandering mendicants of the early samaṇa tradition in Buddhism, practically proxi-
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mate to Brahmanical and Jaina ascetics and to ājīvika mendicants. I suggest that a Buddhist pos-
sibly shared the same religious tradition with a proximate other before his or her conversion. 
Someone who converted to Buddhism would have previously been a member of their proximate 
other’s religious community. In such a context, the appropriation, assimilation, and absorption of 
the religious other observable in the Tittirajātaka would not be so unusual at all.  
  Nonetheless, the presentation of the proximate religious other is significant in the narra-
tive structure of “Partridge Pundit’s Tale.” The partridge dies at the hand of a proximate religious 
other, the evil ascetic mendicant, and, significantly, the characters determine the ascetic’s guilt 
because of the proof in his dreadlocks—the partridge’s “feathers.” The dreadlocks suggest that 
this ascetic is a caricature of a Śaiva renunciate. In the story, the lizard, lion, and tiger all voice 
their criticism in verse of the ascetic’s participation in acrobatics, gambling, the trapping of ani-
mals, getting into fights at night, and an assortment of other offenses, all critiques of his not fol-
lowing sammā kammanta (Buddhist right conduct). Moreover, he kills the partridge as well as a 
cow and her calf for food, and thus suffers from gluttony. It is significant that a non-Buddhist 
religious other is the antagonist of this story and more so that he is a proximate other. A wander-
ing mendicant ascetic (tāpasa in Pāli and Sanskrit) is not so far removed from a Buddhist 
pravrājaka who goes forth after taking the vow of ordination, living as a wandering mendicant 
following Buddhist precepts. As the lifestyle is similar between the two groups, difference mark-
ers such as having dreadlocks as opposed to being shaven-headed take on greater significance. 
For those hearing the story, this Śaivite’s dreadlocks are a blatantly obvious reference to a praxis-
based difference from the Buddhist community. In this way, the bad ascetic’s alterity and differ-
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story at the same time as critiquing the other. 
 Śaivite ascetics most frequently took the brunt of critiques for being false ascetics even in 
Brahmanical literature,  suggesting that this feature of the Jātaka story—the animals’ critique of 64
the ascetic in verse—might also have appeared in what I hypothesize as this story’s other non-
extant versions. The Śaivite ascetic critique confirms von Hinüber’s categorization of this story-
type as part of the earlier Jātaka tradition that does not feature the Buddha speaking or reciting 
aphorisms in verse. Most of the Tittirajātaka’s verses, the earliest preserved portions of the story, 
mock the ascetic’s misdeeds, which one might not expect in an early, pre-Buddhist skeletal story. 
But this same sort of critique of religious other in the guise of a Śaiva ascetic also appears in oth-
er Brahmanical story traditions, so it is possible that this Tittira tale might retain much of the 
same form and content of the oral Brahmanical story that it was before its assimilation into this 
Buddhist telling.  
 To my knowledge there are only three other extant versions of this story. One is the tittira 
tale in the Vāyu Purāṇa, which I have eliminated from my discussion here due to constraints of 
space. Another is a much later (possibly tenth century CE) Buddhist version in the extended 
Mahāvaṃsa from Burmese manuscripts. This Burmese-script Tittirajātaka might have been 
translated back into Pāli from Burmese, might be part of a now lost South Indian Pāli canon re-
cension that von Hinüber hypothesizes, or might be an alternate story version in addition to the 
two main Pāli canon Jātaka stories that potentially existed of the Tittirajātaka (see footnote 54, 
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page 29).  The final extant tale is a version in the Siamese Paksi Pakarana (Book of Birds), a 65
sort of Siamese Pañcatantra.  I base my hypothesis that there must have been additional non-66
extant versions of this story acting as intermediate bridges that developed into the Tittirajātaka as 
we know it today because 1.) the Buddhist story is much more elaborate than the Puranic tales 
told in verse, 2.) the majority of the story’s content is Brahmanical in nature, including the por-
tions of Śaivite critique, and 3.) there are other variants in existence today. 
Out of the Cage and into the…. 
 In “Partridge Pundit’s Tale,” the partridge comes freely to his home, and the Brahmin 
students make him a beautiful cage to honor him, giving honey and flowers as well, as a sort of 
gurudakṣiṇā. This is a reversal of the usual Indian metaphor of birds and cages, namely, that 
through flight, birds can attain liberation from things such as nets, the entrapments of physical 
embodied life, and potentially even release from the cycle of rebirth. The standard metaphor is 
familiar to us from the story of Śuka in the Mahābhārata. As son of Vyāsa he has already at-
tained so much knowledge that he realizes he needs to work toward release; he deliberately seeks 
mukti.  This tale appears in the portion of the Mahābhārata that discusses the dharma of final 67
release, the higher purpose for the lessons in this section of the epic. Buddhist followers were 
also familiar with this metaphor. By the first or second century CE, Buddhist convert Aśvaghoṣa 
recurred to this trope in Brahmanical yogin Arāḍa’s discourse on meditation and release: “Then, 
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like a reed from its grass sheath, or like a bird from a bird-cage, Knower of the field [the soul], 
from body freed, is designated ‘released being.’”   68
 The most direct inspiration for this metaphor is, as Dähnhardt has identified, “birds’ ca-
pacity to rise to the higher dimensions.”  Dähnhardt’s spatial identification is an important dis69 -
tinction in the roles that birds play in South Asian narratives. One common guise in which the 
bird appears is as messenger (dūta) because of the animal’s particular abilities of articulation and 
mimesis, in addition to flight across great distances. The bird as messenger opens a horizontal 
spatial context for interspecies relations between human and bird. But the trope of the bird as re-
leased soul (mukta) presents a vertical spatiality in which to consider the interspecies entangle-
ment. In Dähnhardt’s spatial analysis, “(t)he vertical axis allows for the opening of a channel of 
communication between the immanent and the transcendent planes.”  Significantly, flight is 70
something that human animals admire in birds. This non-human capacity can facilitate access to 
other realms, such as those involved in death leading to transcendence, as in the Buddhist Jā-
takas and Avadānas, or transcendence for transmigration into a different body, as in Kādambarī. 
The Jātakas, the Avadānas, and Kādambarī all include bird spatiality that is both horizontal for 
interspecies communication and vertical for transfers to different realms or transcendence 
through rebirth. 
 According to Kavirāja and his commentators in the Sāhitya Darpaṇa, a work on poetics 
and aesthetics, Kādambarī presents the rasa (aesthetic sentiment) of love in separation, the ab-
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sence of rasa due to the descriptions of death (something of a faux pas in Sanskrit literature), and 
the rasa of compassion (karuṇa).  Because the novel describes love lost, the commentators did 71
not consider that the poetics describing Puṇḍarīka and Mahāśvetā fits under the rubric of eros, 
śṛṅgāra, because their love was “not regainable, or regainable only after transmigration in anoth-
er body.”  Both couples, lovers in prior births, are separated from their loves in their present 72
lives. It is only by dying and transcending this life that the lovers reunite in their next birth, 
which parrot Vaiśampāyana instigates in the king’s court where, amusingly, the Brahmin minister 
who councils the king carries the name Śukanāsa (Parrotbeak or Parrotnosed).  Vaiśampāyana is 73
the agent who reunites lovers via his story-telling that reminds everyone of their former loves. 
 This theme of lovers longing for reunion that is made possible through liberation from the 
body recurs in subcontinental literature via the motif of a bird obtaining release. Dähnhardt dis-
cusses this trope in relation to Persian and Urdu love poetry: “Birds such as the ever-recurring 
nightingale (bulbul) were employed as an allegory of the human soul (rafs) trapped in the cage of 
the physical body yearning to regain its primordial freedom in the unlimited realm of the 
spirit.”  Thus the bird represents release, liberation, and transmigration on an abstract level, and 74
in Kādambarī, parrot Vaiśampāyana’s agency procures this liberation resulting in lovers’ reunion. 
Less typically, his speech, not his ability to fly, mediates his agency toward liberation.  
! '38
 The Kādambarī of Bāṇa, trans. by C. M. Ridding, xii-xiii.71
 Ibid., xiii.72
 The Kādambarī of Bāṇa, trans. by C. M. Ridding, 49.73
 Dähnhardt, “Winged Messengers,” 170. The terminology here is Persian but Dähnhardt describes the motif in 74
Urdu love poetry as well.
 The ideas of release and transmigration that birds embody in Indian texts do not only 
subserve notions of love; the bird is also a model for attaining release as a summum bonum. 
While Hindu texts use the bird as metaphor for human mukti, Buddhist writers bring the bird 
metaphor of release into examples showing ideal behavior aiming toward spiritual advancement. 
This behavior that birds and other animals exhibit frequently appears in the much-derided fable 
genre. Modern scholars often critique and devalue this genre because they consider that these 
stories present anthropomorphisms of animals, meaning that the stories talk about animals while 
really talking about humans.  In Derrida’s description: “We know the history of fabulization and 75
how it remains an anthropomorphic taming, a moralizing subjection, a domestication. Always a 
discourse of man, on man, indeed on the animality of man, but for and in man.”  This is certain76 -
ly true in many contexts. However, this may present an incomplete analysis of such texts, as 
sometimes stories talking about animals are really talking about animals.  
 Anthropomorphism is a convention through which to present information to human lis-
teners. As humans, we privilege linguistic and language-based modes of understanding reality. 
We also identify and recognize ourselves in others, as Kay Milton rightly designated “egomor-
phism.”  I consider that sometimes this egomorphism is the conventional mode of presentation 77
that a writer or artist initiates, and at other times this is an identification with ego that happens on 
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the part of the listener or reader. Further, this identification might be a mistaken one due to the 
complicated material entanglement of living beings in our experience and in our literatures. In 
other words, as human observers, we are naturally predisposed to assume that, for example, a 
monkey who smiles is like us. We solipsistically conclude that this behavior is anthropomorphic, 
instead of simply observing that both humans and apes smile, although our motivations, inten-
tions, or meanings might differ. One might consider the possibility that human animals smile like 
monkeys. An analysis of the metaphorical use of anthropomorphism in fables or other human 
creations and our resultant assumed identification with our own behavior might warrant a par-
adigm reversal.   
 The Buddhist story tradition offers fine examples of anthropomorphism that we humans 
might mistakenly egomorphize, for example, when birds act independently, building toward their 
own liberation and enlightenment. Some of these texts certainly suggest that animal behavior be 
a model for human behavior, but it is animal behavior in its own right. While most schools of 
Buddhism consider animal births inferior to human births in the hierarchical ontology of living 
beings,  some of these stories feature non-human animals attaining liberation, in agreement with 78
Buddhist (and sometimes Brahmanical) ideologies. David Pinault considers that in certain sub-
continental schemas, “non-human animals share with humans the desire for spiritual advance-
ment.”  This might only be an idea that some humans on the subcontinent have, meaning that 79
humans imagine that we share with animals the same desire for advancement and liberation. But 
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working from textual evidence, there is some reason to consider this possibility. Pinault argues 
that  
Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism all possess stories conveying a common insight. Animals 
and humans share the existential condition of being struggling wayfarers, subjected to karma 
and samsara…propelled along the helical vortex of time. Therefore, animals - and this is an 
important difference from Islamic doctrine - share with humans the opportunity to make 
moral and salvation-related choices that will improve their spiritual status after their current 
earthly existence.  80!
Pinault returns the agency to animals, although it was already in place in these stories.  
 One such story is the Śukapotaka Divyāvadāna, a Sanskrit tale of two parrot chicks who 
used speech to advance to Trāyastriṃśa, Tuṣita, and other realms of the gods, eventually becom-
ing pratyeka (solitary) buddhas.  In the story, the two parrots chicks received a visit from the 81
Buddha, who gave them a discourse on the dharma and established the birds in the refuges and 
the precepts of Buddhism. Consequently, they took their vows and, at a crucial moment in their 
lives, about to be eaten by a cat, “(w)ith their awareness focused on the Buddha, the dharma, and 
the community, they died and were reborn among the Cāturmahārājika gods.”  They had repeat82 -
ed the mantras of “Praise to the Buddha! Praise to the dharma! Praise to the community!” imme-
diately before and while the cat mauled them to death.  The story summarizes their future 83
progress through the various divine realms, including Nirmāṇarati (Delighting in Creation) and 
Paranirmitavaśavartin (Masters of Others’ Creations) before their final human births and even-
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tual attainment of pratyeka buddhahood. The Buddha concludes the story by saying, “(i)t is this, 
monks, that you should learn to do.”   84
 Upon hearing this story, as egocentric and egomorphically habituated humans, we tend to 
assume that the parrots represent ideal humans. This means that formally the parrot chicks are 
birds, but that in expression, we think they must represent human behavior and are thus anthro-
pomorphized characters. However, if one does not immediately recur to assumed egomorphism 
and considers the new materialist approach, the story might simply communicate the parrot 
chicks’ agency and describe their enactment via their bodily apparatuses, irrespective of liberal 
humanist ideas of choice in the discussion of agency. After all, parrots are excellent at repeating 
short phrases, and Buddhist monks ought to be doing the same with their minds on the triratna 
(the Buddha, the dharma, and the saṅgha [the community]). These birds are not simply acting 
like humans (egomorphism); the moral tale presents their enactments as a model of animal be-
havior for humans to emulate.  
 The new materialist approach also highlights at least one aspect of Buddhist ontology. 
While Buddhist thought encompasses the idea that choice and effort affect one’s moral conduct 
and progress toward enlightenment, it also forwards the notion that animals, like humans, are on 
a shared path toward eventual enlightenment. New materialism reveals that our entanglement 
with ourselves prevents us from seeing the wider spectrum of materiality and meaning that make 
up the material-discursive content from which we build our lives, ideas, and creations. Here, a 
humanist discourse reliant on dichotomies obscures this aspect of Buddhist ideology—our shared 
path toward enlightenment.  
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Animal Speech and the (Dis)location of the Human 
A Little Bird Told Me: Bird Voice as Creative Voice !
 With my earlier examples of parrot Śuka’s narration of portions of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa  
and Vaiśampāyana’s narration of Kādambarī, I offered evidence that the presence of bird narra-
tors was indicative of the high valuation of mimetic capacities in pre-modern Indian traditions. 
Certain avian species have particularly fine abilities of memorization, imitation, and articulation 
of sound, all necessary for the correct preservation and recitation of texts. A reconsideration of 
agency as an enactment using bodily apparatuses allows narrator birds to be agents of their acts 
and returns them their rightful subjectivity. Detractors unfairly assume that birds simply imitate 
sounds they have heard, removing the birds’ responsibility for their own speech acts. This same 
criticism is often (also unfairly) lodged against past and present Vedic reciters who memorize 
and preserve texts for future generations, as well as against priests and practitioners of modern 
Hindu traditions who chant portions of the Veda from memory without necessarily understanding 
the meaning of what they recite. One example of such denigration is “many Brahmans purport-
edly reciting sacred texts—especially priests during rituals—actually have no idea what their ut-
terances mean ‘and are often reduced to inaudible mumbling or brazening it out with gobbledy-
gook.’”  Opinions like this one indicate that a lack of content-based understanding is a flaw in 85
recitation that detracts from the agency of the act.   
 One of my aims is to problematize this conception of the memorization tradition in light 
of the Indian framework of orality. I reject a purely meaning-based evaluation—that only the un-
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derstanding of a text is important—in favor of considering the entire material-discursive appara-
tus, of which meaning is only one facet. The material apparatus through which memorization and 
reproduction are possible is at least as important as meaning. One classic defense of the tradition 
is that the memorization of massive lengths of text requires such vast mental energy that the peo-
ple who dedicate their efforts to memorization for preservation are not also required to dedicate 
an equally extensive amount of time to language study and textual interpretation, which others 
carry out. Historically, the reciter tradition commanded great admiration, as with the revered 
bhāṇakas (reciters) who memorized extensive amounts of Buddhist compositions before scribes 
recorded the texts in script.  Interestingly, there is some evidence that the bhāṇakas might not 86
only have recited but also redacted some Buddhist piṭaka texts,  suggesting that what superfi87 -
cially appears to be the spokesperson, voice, or “recorder” of material for posterity might also be 
(partial) creator of those same texts. 
 While authorship of an original text is not so significant for Sanskritic oral traditions, not 
acknowledging any creative role in those who narrate or recite may deny a vital part of the re-
citer’s enactment. Recall that Kādambarī’s Vaiśampāyana is the narrator of most of the novel but 
is also an original voice who can claim authorship of verses and songs. In the Caṇḍāla girl’s de-
scription of the parrot’s abilities, “(h)e recites, and himself composes graceful and incomparable 
modern romances, love-stories, plays, and poems, and the like.”  Kādambarī is unusually avian-88
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centric in its medium of narration, agency, and narrative structure, but the author Bāṇa also as-
cribes the arts of composition to the bird. Other Sanskrit texts typically limit birds’ range to ped-
agogy, excluding artistic creation; in the Śukasaptati, the parrot teaches lessons about kāma to a 
young prince, but the parrot is simply the transmitter of knowledge.  
 Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, literary scholars in animal studies, suggest that most 
works incorporate animals to streamline a story’s message and to add interest to what might oth-
erwise be a less stimulating transmittal of material: “Whereas the same stories told about humans 
might lose the moral in a clutter of individuating detail of the sort we are usually keen to know 
about other people, substituting animals as actors strips the characterizations down to prototypes. 
Animals simplify the narrative to a point that would be found flat or at least allegorical if the 
same tales were recounted about humans.”  Here Daston and Mitman identify the reductionist 89
interpretation of the fable genre that the Pañcatantra embodies. This reductionist approach can 
aptly describe certain works of literature but relegates animals to simplistic categories that liter-
ary examples such as Kādambarī do not support. Kādambarī’s parrot is different. 
 Bāṇa presents the animal as an experiencing individual and grants him his own subjectiv-
ity by depicting the “species-typical way of living in the world” for the parrot. Kenneth Shapiro 
and Marion Copeland, two critical theorists in animal studies, have identified these qualities as 
criteria for literary analysis in order to observe if a text resorts to animal representations for sym-
bolic purposes, for human concerns, or for ends that do not efface the lives of the animals them-
selves.  One medium that does not typically erase animal lives is the animal autobiography. The 90
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autobiography, a genre that has received much scholarly attention in recent years, building on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theories of the self and self-reflection,  necessitates subjectivity and sub91 -
jective recounting.  
 Kādambarī qualifies as an animal autobiography and presents the individuality of 
Vaiśampāyana without denying the bird his lived experience. Vaiśampāyana tenderly shares his 
early life as a parrot chick in one episode of animal subjectivity in which tribal Śabaras are hunt-
ing, startling the animals of the forest, and causing the commotion of trampling elephants. 
Vaiśampāyana shares, "all the young parrots (were) resting quietly in their nests.(…)As from my 
youth my wings were hardly fledged and had no strength..... I shook for fear, and thinking that 
my father, who was close by, could help me, I crept within his wings, loosened as they were by 
age."  Then the Śabara leader heard the birds’ cries, intending to take the baby parrots from their 92
nests. He climbed the tree where the birds hid  
and plucked the young parrots from among its boughs one by one, as if they were its fruit, for some were 
not yet strong for flight; some were only a few days old, and were pink with the down of their birth, so 
that they might almost be taken for cotton flowers; some, with their wings just sprouting, were like fresh 
lotus-leaves; some were like the Asclepias fruit; some, with their beaks growing red, had the grace of 
lotus-buds with their heads rising pink from slowly unfolding leaves; while some, under the guise of the 
ceaseless motion of their heads, seemed to try to forbid him, though they could not stop him, for he slew 
them and cast them on the ground.   93
 Bāṇa (writing the character of Vaiśampāyana) recounts this episode in part to explain how 
the bird ended up living with sages in a hermitage in the first place (because the Śabaras ignore 
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insignificant baby Vaiśampāyana, devastating the other birds’ nests), but also to impart authentic 
subjective interest to his story’s readers. This is an animal’s subjectivity and not necessarily an-
thropomorphically-displaced human subjectivity that uses an animal as a metaphorical substitu-
tion for a human. For the purposes of literary criticism, it is irrelevant if the representations are 
accurate or not; realism is only one formal mode among possible presentations of subjectivity. In 
this story, readers get a sense of Bāṇa’s idea of the bird’s lived experiences and Bāṇa presents the 
bird as subject without othering the animal. Sadly, I suggest he has done so in order to demarcate 
another “other,” the Śabara tribals whom the author presents as violent and cruel outcasts who 
ravage the forest. Bāṇa treats the birds as like us, as he has done throughout his twisting love-sto-
ry that tangles Brahmins and birds from beginning to end. But he does so in order to highlight 
the alterity of the true other for him, the Śabara clan’s people.  
A Little Bird Told Them: Pre-modern Paradigms for Bird Speech !
 There are limits to what ancient Indian texts involving bird speech can tell us today; con-
textualization using early Indian taxonomies and ontologies can illuminate what bird voice and 
language about birds might have communicated to readers and listeners in the past. Of the vary-
ing ideologies that account for birds in pre-modern India, perhaps the earliest taxonomy appears 
in the Puruṣasūkta (Ṛgveda 10.90.8). This hymn presents a spatial or habitat-based taxonomy: “it 
made the beasts of the air and of the wild, as well as those of the village.”  This taxonomy sepa94 -
rates air-dwellers from land-dwellers, and is useful for understanding the metaphor of the bird as 
symbol for release. Later Brahmanical classifications of the bird pertain to dietary rules for hu-
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mans but are also habitat-based taxonomies; for example, the dharmaśāstra treats birds as land-
dwellers, both in the wild (āraṇyaka), as with vultures, and in domesticated areas (grāmya), in-
cluding chickens and pet birds.  Parrots kept as pets fit in the grāmya classification. Interesting95 -
ly, parrots’ art of mimicry and use of human speech only develop when the birds live in captivity; 
they “do not imitate other birds in the wild.”  Avian speech abilities, in actual fact, depend on 96
their habitat and their socialization with human animals, making a spatial-based taxonomy such 
as this one a relevant way to conceive of these animals.  
 Bird taxonomies in texts of āyurveda as well as dharmaśāstra also include divisions ac-
cording to how each bird species eats. Broadly speaking, birds fall into either the viṣkira catego-
ry (birds who pick food from the ground by scratching their feet, eating scattered food) or the 
pratuda category (birds who peck food from trees, eating primarily fruit according to the medical 
tradition).  A food consumption based taxonomy is useful for my analysis; the partridge is a 97
viṣkira bird,  picking up scattered food from the ground. The Puranic partridge stories observe 98
how the partridges pick up bits of text from the ground, and this resonates with dharmashastric 
and ayurvedic discourses’ conceptions of this bird.  
 Taxonomies for animals in ancient India additionally classify according to the number of 
feet, thus, the two-footed group (dvipadam) or the four-footed group (catuṣpadam) appears in 
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various Vedic hymns.  Sāyaṇa, a medieval commentator on the Vedas, was surely not alone in 99
placing humans at the head of the two-footed class.  It is curious that this taxonomy, by foot, 100
includes birds in the same classification as humans, whereas animals like cows belong to a dif-
ferent group. This classification, in existence since the Vedic period, puts birds “on equal foot-
ing” with humans, so it is no wonder that the earlier pre-modern period is so entrenched with 
Brahmin-bird entanglements.  101
 These ancient taxonomies illuminate how humans might have understood birds in their 
environs, but it is equally important to consider different kinds of speech, my topic for the re-
mainder of this report. South Asian paradigms concerning speakers and voice challenge western 
paradigms, as for example in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa:  
‘When people in this world offer no oblation and lack true knowledge, but cook for 
themselves animals that cry out, those animals take the form of men in the other world 
and eat in return.’ ‘How does one avoid that?’ ‘When you offer the first oblation with the 
voice, that is how you avoid it and are free of it.’ … ‘When people in this world offer no 
oblation and lack true knowledge, but cook for themselves rice and barley, which 
scream soundlessly, that rice and barley take the form of men in the other world and eat 
in return.’ ‘How can one avoid that?’ ‘When you offer the last oblation with the mind, 
that is how you avoid it and are free of it.’  102!
All living beings cry, even rice and barley, albeit soundlessly. Rice and barley are living beings 
because they have the potential to germinate at any point, thus the life force remains inside them 
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long after harvesting. Rice and barley cry soundlessly, but this is because of the limitations of our 
human indriyas, sense organs, in perceiving their voice. In an interpretation of this Brāhmaṇa, all 
living beings make sounds, cry, or communicate, whether a human can perceive or understand it 
or not.  
 An additional recognition of animal sounds and language appears in Yogasūtra 3.17 (ca. 
400 CE), on the special yogic power of understanding the meaning of animal noises. It is implicit 
in this sūtra that, if animal noises have meaning that some people can understand, these noises 
are language, albeit language that common humans do not understand. The yogic method in this 
chapter is to attain broad mastery of saṃyama—joint restraint in yoga that is practiced on one 
object, consisting of joining three parts: dhyāna (concentration), dhāraṇa (reflection or absorp-
tion), and samādhi (abstract meditation, an active practice of placement).  Then the yogin ap103 -
plies mastery of saṃyama to a number of specific areas, including the interpretation of animal 
sounds that do not follow the conventions of human language. The sūtra reads, “From the mutual 
superposition of concept, objects (or meanings [artha]), and sounds, there is co-mingling 
(saṃkara). From saṃyama on the separate divisions of that co-mingling, there is knowledge of 
the noises of all beings.”  The commentators on this sūtra take the opportunity to address the 104
topic of language, conventions (understood through the unit of the syllable, letter, or word, ac-
cording to which school of philosophy each commentator follows), how meaning occurs inher-
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ently in each unit of sound, and how the human mind is able to perceive and understand sound 
units as language.    105
 The Vyāsabhāṣya, compiled by the original author of the sūtras or, more likely, by an 
anonymous compiler some time later, and the Tattvavaiśāradī of Vācaspati Miśra, a polymath 
with Vedantic and Naiyāyika leanings (ca. 10th century CE), discuss language, sound, and con-
ventional meaning at length. Both commentators’ discourses are relevant here in bringing up the 
notion of speech or voice (vāc) as varṇa-based, i.e., based on sound units of syllables, phonemes, 
or letters, depending on one’s interpretation of the idea of varṇa. The Vyāsabhāṣya for this sūtra 
begins, “In this [sūtra], voice or speech has significance only in the letters,” or more literally, “In 
this [sūtra], the holder of meaning is in the sound units of speech” (tatra vāg varṇeṣu eva artha-
vatī).  This idea contrasts with the Sanskrit grammar commentators’ discussion of speech and 106
animal language in my next section, but varṇas are prominent in that discussion as well. Regard-
less, one key aspect of the Yogasūtra commentary is that “the division (of concept, object or 
meaning [artha], and sound) is known through convention.”  This indicates that the meaning or 107
understanding of a verbal expression depends on the convention that a certain social structure 
dictates, often involuntarily. A word or noise means what the social group in question wants and 
conventionally understands it to mean.  
 According to this philosophical discussion, an animal language has conventions of mean-
ings that animals use to communicate via sound units (or noise). The social structure of that ani-
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mal species (or family, perhaps) has determined those conventions of meaning. If a yogin can 
make the proper divisions (vibhāgās) to deconstruct a speech act, and then can reassemble those 
parts using saṃyama, he is able to understand animal language. Vācaspati Miśra wrote on vari-
ous schools of thought in India, so his comments at times might reflect a broad, widespread per-
spective that reflects the thinking of most āstika (orthodox Brahmanical) schools of philosophy. 
He followed the bhāṣya’s idea of meaning in speech and added that “this speech is meaningful 
only in the syllables or sounds as established in common belief and not in the verbal expres-
sion—this is the meaning.”  With this he adds another layer of meaning to the earlier notion 108
that speech’s content is convention-based and according to sound: for Vācaspati, it is not the ver-
bal expression of this speech that imparts meaning. The act of speaking is not important; some-
thing else is. This idea will also be important in the following discussion. 
“Oh, my beauty, the roosters are singing all together!” When Sanskrit Grammarians Speak 
about Speaking 
 The Yogasūtrāṇi and commentaries only tangentially reflect perceptions about animal 
language on the subcontinent in the period from approximately the fourth or fifth century CE 
through the tenth century CE, although this school of thought certainly builds on broader cur-
rents of thought that surround the school. The grammatical tradition of the Sanskrit language of-
fers significantly more insight into animal language and vāk (speech or voice). The most perti-
nent discussion stems from the Mahābhāṣya that Patañjali composed; this work incorporates Kā-
tyāyana’s commentatorial Vārttika in order to analyze Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhāyī, the foundation text of 
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Sanskrit grammar and linguistics. Patañjali’s text initiates a valuable discussion among later 
commentators who were linguists, grammarians, and philosophers.  
 The passage discussing animal speech occurs in Pāṇini’s section detailing ātmanepada 
verb usage. Pāṇini indicates when to use and not to use middle verbs, sometimes with a reflexive 
sense, sometimes depending on the verbal root and preverbs. Patañjali clarifies Pāṇini’s concise 
aphorism 1.3.48 as he often does, by offering a negative example to show the opposite usage in 
which the sūtra rule does not apply. Here, then, he includes a case when one must use the 
parasmaipada verbal terminations. Patañjali offers an example apparently extracted from roman-
tic verse: “varatanu sampravadanti kukkuṭāḥ” (“Oh, my beauty, the roosters are singing all to-
gether!”).  This is a situation when one must use the parasmaipada and not the ātmanepada 109
form sampravadante. The traditional interpretation of Pāṇini’s sūtra is that we reserve āt-
manepada for situations that are “vyaktavācāṃ samuccāraṇe”  (“In the sense of ‘vyakta’ 110
voice[s] speaking together.”) The grammar tradition concludes that this implicitly suggests hu-
man speech, but I elaborate the commentators’ discussion of vyaktavācām as follows.  111
 The original point of contention arises because vyaktavāk literally means “manifested 
voice or speech,”  meaning speech sounds that are audible and emitted from the mouth of any 112
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 Pāṇini sūtra 1.3.48.110
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commentatorial discussion. The commentaries appear in Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya of Patañjali, vol. 2, 165.
 The word vyakta has many meanings, including manifest, perceptible to the senses, and apparent. Secondary, 112
derived meanings for the word include distinct, intelligible, developed, and so on.
living being.  After all, the dhātupāṭha indicates the use of verbal root vad for both human 113
speech and animal “cries.” Because the same verb can express either that an animal speaks or a 
human speaks, the tradition has interpreted Pāṇini to mean that, when using preverbs “sam” and 
“pra,” one form (parasmaipada) is for animals while the other (ātmanepada) is for humans. Pre-
sumably, most humans would think it obvious that this sort of speech (vyaktavāk) implies human 
voiced speech. The commentarial discussion arises, however, because these grammarians are 
pedants and need to negotiate the precise meaning, range, and interlocutors of such “manifest 
speech,” since one could argue that many animals voice utterances with manifest audible speech, 
the only indication that Pāṇini gives.  
 The discussion is not facile, so here I will detail Patañjali’s argument, clarify the com-
mentators’ interpretation, and add my own supercommentary. Patañjali develops an explanation 
of why the designation of manifest or articulate speech refers to human and not animal speech, 
which the later tradition generally labels avyaktavāk. In the process, he has to adapt the semantic 
range of the term “vyakta” for his purposes and resort to an unconventional analysis of the nomi-
nal compound in Pāṇini’s sūtra. First, Patañjali states that animals like roosters do have mani-
fested voice. Then, he justifies the rule dictating one verbal form for humans and another for an-
imals through his determination that “vyakta” must mean not only manifest and perceptible but 
especially articulate in voice, meaning that the voice must be able to articulate all of the sounds 
(varṇa) in the Sanskrit alphabet.  He specifies that roosters do not have this ability.    114
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 Interestingly, in his effort to make articulate speech the domain of only humans, Patañjali unintentionally ex114 -
cludes some humans from this group: those who, because of irregularities in their organs of vocal production or be-
cause of different capacities, are not able to produce all of the sounds represented in the Sanskrit alphabet.
 Then Patañjali introduces a straw man to challenge his idea by saying, “But roosters do 
have articulate voice and they say ‘cock-a-doodle-doo!’” Patañjali proceeds to tear down the 
straw man with the argument that “cock-a-doodle-doo!” is a semblance or human imitation of 
what roosters say. Then, he adds another distinction to the idea of articulate speech by changing 
the analysis of the compound from “those beings whose voice is articulate” to “those beings 
whose letters (or sounds) are articulate in their speech.”  He adds a layer of meaning that might 115
not be apparent or at all present in Pāṇini’s sūtra. Not only does the voice have to be articulate in 
the production of letters from the alphabet (as some parrots’ voices are) but the letters and sounds 
produced by that voice must be articulate in their speech or expression; this is essentially the dif-
ference between producing articulate sounds and producing articulate phonemes (divisions of 
words that can convey individual meaning in their expression). The subtler layer of meaning here 
is that “those whose letters are articulate in their speech” also takes on connotations of articula-
tion in the sense of “intelligible and more developed,” because these letters and syllables express 
articulate notions. A voice must not only be articulate, but also articulate sounding. Connotations 
of intellect as humans know it are implicit in Patañjali’s interpretation of the sūtra.   
 Patañjali’s largest addition to the understanding of Pāṇini’s sūtra is his insertion of varṇa 
into the idea of an articulate, manifest voice. The focus on varṇa also appeared in the Yogasūtra 
commentary, in which the bhāṣya described speech as varṇa-based: “the holder of meaning is in 
the sound units (letters, phonemes, or syllables) of speech.” It is not surprising that these two dif-
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ferent schools of thought would base their discussion of voice on the element of varṇa, since it is 
a key feature of language, and both discussions are linguistic in focus. Varṇa’s meaning is diffi-
cult to fix precisely in the Yogasūtra commentaries. Varṇa generally denotes variety in things 
ranging from colors, kinds, and letters to people and musical sounds; all of these meanings indi-
cate variety on a superficial or perceptible level, something that shows difference in its outward 
appearance. Therefore, it is ideal for conveying meaning in language, since different varṇas (as 
letters or syllables) perceptibly indicate differences in meaning to the listener. The focus on 
varṇa as Sanskrit syllable in the grammar debate seems an unfair bias toward a Sanskrit-centered 
discourse that necessarily excludes animals, but scholars of language would naturally recur to 
this. Additionally, it is noteworthy that for the Yogasūtra discussion, varṇa is key in determining 
meaning of speech, while in the grammar discussion, varṇa is key in determining a being’s artic-
ulation. 
 The later grammar commentators further enhance Patañjali’s discussion. Seventeenth-to-
eighteenth-century commentator Nāgeśa states that it is implicit that not every being has articu-
late speech because Patanjali specified “all of those who have manifest voice,” demonstrating 
that the discussion was never all inclusive (there are also those who do not have manifest voice). 
But Nāgeśa adds his own opinion—that animals lack articulate voice. Kaiyaṭa (ca. eleventh cen-
tury CE) contributes to Patañjali’s discussion by adding that parrots, mynahs, and others do not 
innately (svabhāvikam) have an articulate voice. This is an interesting comment; such birds ob-
viously can produce articulate voicing of sounds innately if they are able to do so at all. Howev-
er, with this statement Kaiyaṭa makes an observation I referred to earlier: parrots speak human 
languages only when in captivity, not in nature. Kaiyaṭa expresses this with “the range of some 
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of the letters/sounds (in parrots, mynahs, and so on) is because of the will (vaśa) and effort of 
humans,” meaning that the will and dominion of humankind must be present for parrots to articu-
late articulately. On one hand, Kaiyaṭa attributes the will and determination to humans, thus re-
moves a great deal of the birds’ own agency in their speech. On the other hand, he makes an ob-
servation about parrot speech in captivity that western biologists only articulated in the twentieth 
century.  
 Despite the discussion’s conclusions about the inarticulate nature of animal voice, the 
whole discourse would please cognitive ethologists today in that Patañjali questions and justifies 
his distinctions of human and animal, but does not unthinkingly commit anthropodenial.  116
Ethologist Frans De Waal uses this term to indicate how humans underestimate commonalities 
between humans and other animals; we deny that other animals can act, think, or manifest behav-
iors in ways that we humans can. Patañjali himself problematizes human notions about language 
and what we think about animal voice. While he ultimately undermines the idea that animal 
speech is articulate, he makes a deliberate effort to define human speech in the context of other 
animal speech and he concerns himself with examining his definition and others’ definitions, as 
do his later commentators.  
 In order to distinguish his definition of human voice from other animal voice, Patañjali 
has to gesture to a perceived lack in animals’ speech: “in the voice of these (roosters),  all of the 
letters starting from ‘a’ are not manifest.” Nāgeśa reiterates this idea and adds that “the meaning 
of ‘those who are vyakta (articulate)’ is those in whose voice the whole range of sounds starting 
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with ‘a’ are articulated in a fully manifest form” (vaikharīrūpāyām). I will return to the notion of 
a fully manifest (vaikharī) form below, but I want to highlight that he situates the whole range of 
sounds in the human voice alone, with the complete range not present in other animals. The fact 
that he clarifies this designation of “articulate” means it is an important one for him.  
 The identification of this lack—an incomplete range of Sanskrit letter production in ani-
mal voice—is an accusation prevalent among anthropocentric thinkers when analyzing animals. 
Derrida notes this mode of labeling animals as “lacking,” “poor,” or “deprived,” a critique that 
declares the incomplete nature of animals in some capacity with regard to humans in order to 
signal difference and inferiority. Derrida reminds us that when thinkers focus on deprivation and 
“what is lacking in animals,” those thinkers align themselves with Heidegger’s school. Heideg-
ger considered animals to be weltarm, “poor in world” or impoverished, because he believed that 
animal behavior lacked meaning and was not “world-forming.” I argue that Sanskrit grammari-
ans consider animals to be impoverished in varṇavyañjana and establish a dichotomy persistent 
to this day in the grammatical tradition that divides human speech and animal speech as vyak-
tavāk (articulate voice) and avayktavāk (inarticulate voice).  Sanskrit language defines animal 117
speech by negation, with the privative particle -a signaling what is not there. In all fairness to 
Martin Heidegger, he states that he does not designate animals in this way to create a hierarchy 
of humans over other animals,  but simply recognizes a lack that, if anything, is worthy of hu118 -
man sympathy and compassion. In all fairness to Patañjali, he does not generalize about lacks or 
impoverished speech; he is clear to make his comments species specific to the chicken, which 
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Derrida would have applauded. What Derrida most resented was the designation of an abstract 
general idea of “the animal” when there are so many animals, so many species, and so many in-
dividuals within species.  
 A comparison of the two commentators’ language reveals an ideological difference that 
may have developed over time. Kaiyaṭa, commenting on the Mahābhāṣya in the eleventh centu-
ry, identifies that parrots, mynahs, and other birds do not innately have these capacities of articu-
lation, while Nāgeśa, seven centuries later, writes that “animals lack an articulate voice like that 
of humans, etc.” Without reading too much into one brief statement within a lengthy commentary 
written for an even more immense work, Nāgeśa intentionally or unintentionally projects some 
of the same humanist dichotomous discourse of man versus beast that European “enlightened” 
rationalist thinkers were articulating at exactly the same historical moment. This discourse in Eu-
rope hyper-valued the mind, man, and the agency of humans, things that resonate with Nāgeśa’s 
discourse.  
 Patañjali raises an intriguing point when he rejects the common assumption that roosters 
say, “cock-a-doodle-doo!” (in Sanskrit, roosters really say “coo-coo!” hence their name kukkuṭa). 
He declares, “This is an imitation of them” [i.e., a human imitation of what roosters say] 
(anukaraṇam etat teṣām). He continues the idea that roosters do not say such things by stating 
that “articulate voice” refers to those whose letters and sounds are articulate in speech. In stating 
that “coo-coo!” or “cock-a-doodle-doo!” is only an approximation of what roosters actually 
voice, he indirectly communicates that humans are incapable of producing the exact vocaliza-
tions of roosters; we can only produce an imperfect imitation, a resemblance (anukaraṇam). He 
does not appreciate the lack in humans of fully articulating rooster vocalizations, although this is 
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not too surprising for a grammarian working under the assumption that the Sanskrit language is 
the perfect and only paradigm. Nonetheless, he does not seem to have realized that what is mani-
fested (vyakta) as the articulations of this bird is beyond the scope of the human organs of speech 
so well studied in Sanskrit śikṣā, the Vedāṅga or study of pronunciation and articulation.  
 Parrot Vaiśampāyana, however, appears to have studied śikṣā in Bāṇa’s Kādambarī. Fur-
ther, Bāṇa appears to be conversant with the grammarian discussion of animal speech from the 
commentaries, or, this sort of discourse about speech and articulation was common by the sixth 
century CE. Bāṇa alludes to this discourse in a parodied parallel of the grammarian’s debate us-
ing similar terminology. Vaiśampāyana has mastered the whole range of Sanskrit varṇas:  
(T)he king, having heard it, was amazed, and joyfully addressed his minister Kumārapālita- 
‘Thou hast heard the bird’s clear enunciation of consonants, and the sweetness of his into-
nation. This, in the first place, is a great marvel, that he should raise a song in which the syl-
lables are clearly separated; and there is a combination of correctness with clearness in the 
vowels and anunāsikas. Then again, we had something more than that: for in him, though a 
lower creation, are found the accomplishments, as it were, of a man, in a pleasurable art, and 
the course of his song is inspired by knowledge… whereas, generally, birds and beasts are 
only skilled in the science of fearing, eating, pairing, and sleeping.’ !
Kumārapālita replied: ‘Where is the wonder? For all kinds of bird, beginning with the parrot 
and the maina (sic), repeat a sound once heard, as thou, O king, knowest; so it is no wonder 
that exceeding skill is produced either by the efforts of men, or in consequence of perfection 
gained in a former birth. Moreover, they formerly possessed a voice like that of men, with 
clear utterance. The indistinct speech of parrots, as well as the change in elephants’ tongues, 
arose from a curse of Agni.’   119!
 Bāṇa artfully and comically summarizes many ideas that arise in this report. He refers to 
the debate on the capacities of bird speech and distinct speech. He tangentially mentions the sub-
continental ideology of animals perfecting themselves in former births. He admits that birds 
speak through the efforts of men (puruṣaprayatna in the Patañjali commentary). He confirms the 
particular perceived beauty of bird voice as some Brahmins had evaluated it earlier in regard to 
the Taittirīya recitation, here expressed as “the sweetness of his intonation.” Finally, Bāṇa mocks 
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the assumed humanist dichotomy—human skills and knowledge versus “birds and beasts…
skilled in …eating, pairing, and sleeping”—indicating that this division existed in discourses in 
South Asia as well as in the west. 
 Returning to the debate on articulateness, Nāgeśa refers to yet another discourse in his 
commentary on this Pāṇini sūtra and other sūtras. He interprets Patañjali’s definition of articu-
late voice in saying, “the letters starting with ‘a’ are articulated in those whose voice has forms 
that are fully manifest and articulate. This is the meaning of ‘they are articulate.’” He expresses 
this idea in the phrase “yeṣāṃ vāci vaikharīrūpāyām.” His interpretation of “articulate” alludes 
to one part of a four part theory of speech that Bhartṛhari (ca. 450-500 CE) developed.  
 Bhartṛhari, another early theorist of the Sanskrit language whose dating falls roughly be-
tween Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa, elaborated some ideas about classifications of voice that were ex-
tant since the late Vedic period, as Nāgeśa later determined.  The four classifications were parā 120
vāk (also called pratibhā), paśyantī vāk, madhyamā vāk, and vaikharī vāk, according to the de-
gree to which the voice is manifest, from least to most.  Early philosophers of language typical121 -
ly considered the least manifest forms of vāk to be immanent formations of speech or language, 
and also the most representative of Brahman (the universal, the Veda, etc.). In his Vākyapadīya, 
Bhartṛhari writes that parā vāk is śabdabrahman,  the word-Brahman associated with divine, 122
revealed sound. This divine speech is, incidentally, the least manifest of all forms of speech, 
while vaikharī vāk, at the opposite end of the spectrum, represents the most manifest, mundane, 
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and least divine speech.  Bhartṛhari affected great influence on thinkers of the Śaiva tantra sys123 -
tem, including Abhinavagupta and later Vedānta philosophers. Some of his ideas that gained cur-
rency in tantric thought include the notions that “all knowledge is permeated by word, (and) that 
all knowledge is vāc, which is pratyavamarśinī or self-aware and is the source of all branches of 
knowledge and art.”  124
 Nāgeśa was one follower of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic theory, which appears in the commen-
tary for this Pāṇini sūtra in his description of vyakta voice as having the form of vaikharī. Else-
where, Nāgeśa locates the four forms of voice in the body: “parā vāk mūlacakrasthā paśyantī 
nābhisaṃsthitā | hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā ||”  “Supreme voice is locat125 -
ed at the root cakra, paśyantī (visible) at the navel, the middle voice is known to be placed in the 
heart, and uttered voice is at the position of the throat.” According to this theory, vaikharī, apart 
from being uttered with the breath, is not particularly special.  
 In contrast, “pratibhā (parā vāc) was common to all beings, birds and beasts; it was re-
garded as a flash of intelligence and also as constituting the meaning of a sentence,”  according 126
to Bhartṛhari. This level of speech conveys the most fundamental layer of content, and again, is 
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the least manifest speech form. With an understanding of this aspect of Nāgeśa’s commentary, 
we see that the whole discussion of vyaktavāk versus avyaktavāk is not the hierarchy of voice 
that one might imagine. If we expand our concept of language to include the idea that articulate 
voice might not indicate superior voice, the analysis of animal speech by Patañjali’s commenta-
tors and the criticisms of anthropocentrism expressed by numerous scholars need reconsidera-
tion. We need not attribute knowledge or any particularly exemplary qualities to articulate speech 
except that it is articulate within the context of Sanskrit phonetics. 
Speech, Subjectivity, and Story-telling 
 One cannot escape an analysis of speech that uses criteria centered on language. It is cer-
tainly challenging to develop other models to describe non-humans that do not rely upon human 
terms. Derrida favors discussions of inscribed “traces” as a way to avoid human-like forms of 
language and communication. However, humans generally formulate definitions and meanings 
of language that assert our authoritative domination over other beings, even as simple as 
Kaiyaṭa’s crediting an animal’s speech to human efforts to make that animal speak. In the impos-
sibility of removing language and forms framed in human modes from the question at hand, a 
reevaluation of agency and subjectivity is necessary.  
 The tantric and Vedantic philosophical traditions that utilized Bhartṛhari’s model for 
speech concerned themselves with language, and also with subjectivity. The Kashmiri Śaivas 
who embraced Bhartṛhari’s speech analysis also embraced the idea that “consciousness and its 
contents are identical both in manifest and unmanifested forms.”  This tradition, headed by Ab127 -
hinavagupta (tenth-eleventh century CE), resolved the dichotomy of mind and matter one mil-
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lennium before quantum physicists took up a similar approach toward material-discursive phe-
nomena. Other schools of Vedānta besides Kashmiri Śaivism opposed the conceptualization of 
subject and object as independent, which was the project of so many schools of western human-
ism. For Kashmiri advaita Śaivism, there is no difference between observer and observed. Ob-
jectification is simply the externalization of the inner reality and the subject is the object.  This 128
perspective on subjectivity is valuable in appreciating the Brahmin-bird entanglement and the 
transpositions that pre- and post-date this school’s flourishing of inquiry.  
 While transpositions between beings was a more facile project for such thinkers, others, 
like Heidegger, found it difficult to imagine. Even Vaiśampāyana considered such transpositions 
a challenge, although he desired to return to human form: “…I sorrowfully thought how hard it 
would be to rise from being a bird to being a Brahman, not to say a saint, who has the bliss of 
heaven.”  Nonetheless, such entanglements did occur in numerous Indian traditions and texts. 129
The identification of the Taittirīyas with or as birds is just one example in which texts articulate 
and promote these entanglements. New materialist approaches to the entangled manifestations of 
matter and discourse aid our understanding of such processes of identification. Barad speaks of 
differentiating and not of othering; the concern is not separation but making connections and 
commitments.  If we remove notions of separation from the ideas of “partridge” and “person,” 130
transposition is easier. If our textual and recitation traditions are committed to avian ideas and 
ideals, our names and texts become entangled with those birds. If we cannot literally transpose or 
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do not want to accept ideas of entanglement, we can at least go with animals part of our way, to 
imagine better poetry and textual recitation, or to communicate our shared experiences and sto-
ries.  
 My presentation of multiple story variants for the partridge tale is exemplary of the mul-
tiplicity of narrations that echo across India and many literary traditions. A. K. Ramanujan re-
jected the idea of a single Ur-text as the original source for any story tradition; rather, he sug-
gested that multiple versions of tales were an “endemic pool of signifiers (like a gene pool).”  131
He located the multiplicity of story forms within scientific discourse, suggesting that stories re-
produce within a spatial context. I argue that new materialist discourse offers new modes for un-
derstanding such story traditions. In Barad’s model accounting for the variety of story creations, 
she says that “structures are to be understood as material-discursive phenomena that are iterative-
ly (re)produced through ongoing material-discursive intra-actions.”  This allows for endless 132
complexity in open systems that include transfers and transpositions between spheres that are 
more material or more discursive in nature.  
 Barad adapted her mode of explaining story variants from Donna Haraway, another sci-
entist whose theoretical work and social critique fit neatly into Barad’s new materialism. Har-
away wrote, “diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, 
(and) difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflec-
tions, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form, thereby 
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giving rise to industries of [story-making about origins and truths]. Rather, diffraction can be a 
metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness.”  Observing differences among story vari133 -
ants can reveal information about critique and interactions between social groups in a way that 
reflected, identical story repetitions cannot. The tittira tales feature narrative processes that are 
observable as diffractions rather than distortions of stories. This small phenomenon is analogous 
to the larger tradition of narration in India, in which diffracted variations voice different concerns 
and priorities. Further, choosing birds to voice these narrations can express this diffraction well. 
The parrot’s mimicry is almost identical to our voice, but is still a resemblance of a text recited 
or imagined elsewhere. Although virtually the same, the bird’s voice adds something more, some 
level of diffraction desired by early Sanskrit writers. The parrot voices a diffraction of our 
speech, and similarly, we imitate the rooster’s speech, which is again a diffraction (“cock-a-doo-
dle-doo!”). 
Conclusion: The (Dis)location of the Human 
 Singling out bird speech and language is one mode to explore how Sanskrit writers dealt 
with identity and difference. Interspecies transpositions and the phenomenon of the Brahmin-bird 
entanglement help us understand how writers and thinkers articulated their own identities and 
made distinctions about their speech in relation to others. Brahmin-bird names for ascetic prac-
tices and śākhā lineages alike are manifestations of this entanglement within the Sanskrit lan-
guage itself. The stories that I have identified as the Taittirīya’s etiology are diffracted attempts at 
justifying and positioning the bird and the human in an entanglement that was in place well be-
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fore the fourth century BCE, when Pāṇini first addressed the entanglement. My analysis of these 
etiological stories also suggests explanations as to why the partridge and the parrot held such 
fascination for Brahmanical writers. In part, they imagined birds as the retainers of Brahmanical 
lineages that were somehow threatened or endangered. The Buddhist rendering of the partridge 
story articulates this Brahmin-bird entanglement as well, but does so in order to mark Buddhist 
identity and difference.  
 Examining animal speech and voice allows us to reevaluate the agency of speech acts in a 
tradition where recitation may be more significant than original composition. This new model for 
understanding agency, which de-prioritizes intention and acknowledges the complex relations 
between matter and discourse, allows for creativity within schemas of traditional recitation and 
mimicry, as the speaker always contributes something to the telling. This model of voiced agency 
also accounts for episodes of autobiographical speech acts concealed within broader projects of 
narration, repetition, and transmission of texts. For example, Bāṇa’s Kādambarī presents narra-
tion as the mode of textual transmission and negotiates interspecies relations by first acknowl-
edging that the Brahmin-bird entanglement exists—and had existed since the Vedic period—and 
then using humor to illustrate these complex relations. In contrast, the Jātakas’ way of negotiat-
ing interspecies relations and speech ultimately uses animal-voiced agency to comment on reli-
gious identity and the other, for conversion purposes and to teach Buddhist dharma.  
 Spatial relations, anthropomorphism, and egomorphism highlight other ways to consider 
the distinctions of species and speech that arose in pre-modern South Asia. Bird-mediated spa-
tiality can illustrate certain aspects of Indian religious ideologies such as rebirth on a vertical axis 
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and interspecies conversations for more mundane purposes on a horizontal axis. I acknowledge 
the value of identifying anthropomorphism and egomorphism in literature, but I also suggest that 
literary forms such as fables, seemingly dominated by outward suggestions of anthropomor-
phism, do not always relegate the animal to purely allegorical reductions.  
 Whereas other scholars tend to critique such anthropomorphism, I suggest we bring a dif-
ferent valuation of agency into our analyses of speech. By de-prioritizing meaning- and inten-
tion-based agency in speech acts, animal enactments mediated through speech and voice can of-
fer exemplars that are not only allegorical. Rather, they demonstrate the ideal behaviors that hu-
mans wish to have, as in the Śukapotaka Divyāvadāna story. This tale reveals that the parrot 
chicks’ speech acts contain both agency and value. Understood within the recitation tradition, 
such acts are not derivative of human behaviors at all, as is the usual interpretation of fables ex-
hibiting anthropomorphism. Perhaps while reading and interpreting such texts, we unintentional-
ly anthropomorphize, and our anthropocentric position prevents us from observing that parrots 
(and indeed many animals) manifest ideal qualities and behaviors that are not solely human in 
nature. Attributing such behaviors—articulation and mimicry—to humans, when they occur 
among other species, brings our analytical reading into texts and artistic creations. Sometimes, 
anthropomorphism is only present because we read it into texts.  
 The examination of South Asian ontological understandings of birds and other living be-
ings offers another way to explore the possibilities of animal entanglement, as present in Vedic, 
dharmashastric, and ayurvedic discourses. These taxonomies present remarkable paradigms for 
observing speech and voice in Indian texts, including grains that cry or speak and yogins who 
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attain understanding of animal speech by deconstructing and reconstructing the noises that make 
up their speech patterns, which are laden with the meaning built into such language by conven-
tion.  
 The Sanskrit grammarian discussion reveals that their project was not to transpose into 
the animal, as other Sanskrit writers attempted, but rather to position human voice in relation to 
animal voice. The grammarians were preoccupied with determining if there was any transposi-
tion between human and non-human speech because Pāṇini’s sūtra and the dhātupāṭha might 
have suggested a lack of distinction between animal and human speech. The implications of 
Pāṇini’s original message forced Sanskrit linguists to define and distinguish animal and human 
voice. Pāṇini’s masterwork on the Sanskrit language presented a potential animal-human entan-
glement that was too much for later grammarians, even for Patañjali. The entanglement appeared 
in Paninian discourse but concerned the discourse (i.e., speech) of animals and humans. As a re-
sult, the grammarians endeavored to articulate the materiality of human speech as different from 
animal-manifested speech. This whole commentary elegantly negotiates the placement of animal 
and man through the commentators’ own definitions of speech and language.  
 Embedded in Nāgeśa’s commentary is a further classification of speech within the broad-
er discussion: Bhartṛhari’s taxonomy of voice. Approaching this taxonomy via Śaiva tantric and 
Vedantic thought that had currency at the time of Patañjali’s commentators allows us to evaluate 
animal speech in a way that does not demote animal voice within a hierarchy. Further, 
Bhartṛhari’s classification of voice negotiates definitions of speech for humans and animals with-
in a system that acknowledges the material-discursive entanglement of phenomena. Bhartṛhari’s 
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classification presents a spectrum of speech (a discursive topic) that ranges from more material 
(vaikharī voice) to less material (parā or ultimate voice). The least material phenomenon of 
voice, parā vāk, is laden with valuable content and meaning, thus the immaterial aspects of vāk 
contain potentially the greatest discursive content. Bhartṛhari’s system presents an early precur-
sor of the material-discursive entanglement developed by Barad in the twenty-first century. The 
affinity of these two thinkers justifies my application of new materialist thought to my analysis 
of voice in early Indian discussions of voice and speech.  
 Other early Indian articulations of voice and speech to explore in the future include addi-
tional diffractions of the partridge tale extant in the Paksi Pakarana, the extended Mahāvaṃsa, 
and the Vāyu Purāṇa. Further contexts that negotiate animal speech in relation to humans, such 
as the Haṃsadūta (Goose Messenger) of Vedānta Deśika, the Pañcatantra, and myriad other 
works, would also enrich this study. Ultimately, all of these Indian thinkers used speech in both 
animals and humans to articulate their own paradigms for understanding themselves and their 
complex environments that included animals. Their texts involving “repetition,” preservation, 
and other animal enactments detail the paradigms for us as they might have done for listeners 
and readers of the past. 
“O people, we have been taught the language of birds, and we have been given from all things. 
Indeed, this is evident bounty.” Quran 27:16.  134
!
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Appendix A !
Pāli text of the Tittirajātaka excerpt (for my English translation, see “Partridge Pundit’s Tale” in 
Etiological Story Cousins) !
Tittirajātaka (story 438)  135
atīte bārāṇasiyaṃ  brahmadatte rajjaṃ karente eko disāpāmokkho ācariyo bārāṇasiyaṃ pañ-
casatānaṃ māṇavakānaṃ sippaṃ vācento ekadivasaṃ cintesi.....  
(....) 
.....eko tittiro pi tattha nibaddhavāso ahosi, so ācariyassa māṇavānaṃ mante  vācentassa sutvā 136
tayo pi vede uggaṇhi.  māṇavā tena saddhiṃ ativissāsikā ahesuṃ. 137
aparabhāge māṇavesu nipphattiṃ appattesu yeva ācariyo kālam akāsi,  māṇavā tassa sarīraṃ 138
jhāpetvā  vālukāthūpaṃ katvā nānāpupphehi pūjetvā rodanti paridevanti.  139
atha te tittiro “kasmā rodathā” ti āha. “ācariyo no sippe aniṭṭhite yeva kālakato,  tasmā 140
rodāmā” ti. 
“evaṃ sante mā cintayittha, ahaṃ vo sippaṃ vācessāmīti”. 
“tvaṃ kathaṃ jānāsīti?” 
“ahaṃ ācariye tumhākaṃ vācente sutvā va tayo vede paguṇe akāsin” ti.   
“tena hi attano paguṇabhāvaṃ amhe jānāpehīti.”  …….. 
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 The term mante, the plural form of manta (Sanskrit mantra) is of interest for animal language within the com136 -
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 The word pi (Sanskrit api) here has the sense of totality or entirety.137
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 This is a causative gerund with a Sanskrit parallel from root kṣā (to burn, to catch fire).139
 Kālakata instead of kālagata is one instance in Pāli where the voiced stop /g/ in gata has transformed into a 140
voiceless stop /k/ due to influence of the first word in the compound, kāla.
tittiro “tena hi suṇāthā” ‘ti tesaṃ gaṇṭhigaṇṭiṭṭhāṇam  eva pabbatamatthakā nadiṃ otārento 141
viya osāresi. 
maṇavā haṭṭhatuṭṭhā hutvā tittirapaṇḍitassa santike sippaṃ paṭṭhapesuṃ.  
so pi disāpāmokkhācariyaṭṭhāne ṭhatvā te sippaṃ vācesi.   
māṇavā tassa suvaṇṇapañjaraṃ karitvā upari vitānaṃ bandhitvā suvaṇṇataṭṭake madhulājādīni  
upaharatā nānāvaṇṇehi pupphehi pūjentā mahantaṃ sakkāraṃ kariṃsu.  
“tittiro kira araññāyatane pañcasate māṇave mante vācetīti” sakalajambudīpe pākaṭo ahosi… 
!
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Appendix B  142
English translation of Pāṇini sūtra 1.3.48, Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, and commentators’ discus-
sion !
[Pāṇini sūtra expresses, “Use ātmanepada…”] 
“In the sense of ‘vyakta’ voice[s] speaking together.” 
The Topic of Determining the Meaning of ‘Vyaktavāk’ 
Patañjali [asks]:  
“What is the meaning of ‘vyaktavācām’?”  143
[Patañjali responds with a cited verse as an example of usage]  
“Oh, my beauty, the roosters are singing all together!”  144
[Patañjali counters]  
“One arrives here at this [the situation of using ātmanepada], even when ‘vyaktavācām’ is being 
said, because these [roosters] are also beings whose voice is manifested.  And they are beings 145
whose voice is manifested for the following reason: when [something] is uttered  by a rooster, 146
[people] say “The rooster says [sings, etc.].”   147
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 In parenthesis I have supplied the translation of a term into English or Sanskrit. In square brackets I have clarified 142
the meaning, either because of the complexity of multiple voices in the discussion or because the statements are 
compact due to the commentarial style of Sanskrit. I have used bold for content in the original Sanskrit which a 
commentator writes in order to add another layer of meaning to a word or phrase.
 Throughout this excerpt, I change my translation for the word “vyakta” as the commentators develop different 143
connotations for the word and express this in their discussion. Thus, the translation of “vyakta” varies in the text 
from “manifested” or “uttered” and ends as “articulate.”
 This example is meant to illustrate proper grammatical Sanskrit verbal usage when animals talk (using paras144 -
maipada), reserving ātmanepada for humans.
 As is apparent from the example cited. 145
 Using root vad in udite. 146
 This statement is meant to challenge the use of parasmaipada for animal voice by arguing that surely roosters 147
have manifest, articulate speech when they make noise; hence we say, “the roosters ‘speaks.’”
“Then, if ‘vyaktavācām’ (of those beings whose voice is articulate) is said, indeed, all beings [for 
which one can use root ‘vad’=to speak] can be said to be ‘those whose voice is articulate.’ There-
fore, it will be understood that what is meant is exceptionally (prakarṣa) [articulate] i.e., ‘those 
who are especially articulate in voice.’ And who are these especially [articulate ones]? In those 
whose voice all the letters starting from ‘a’ are manifested. And in the voice of these [roosters], 
all of the letters starting from ‘a’ are not manifested.” 
Kaiyaṭa [in his Pradīpa]:  
“Where it is said, ‘sarva eveti’ (=‘Indeed, all…’) [and on from there]- Those who make a false 
meaning [say that] the meaning from the reading [of the Dhātupāṭha] is: ‘vada vyaktāyām 
vāci’  (=‘Root vad means articulate voice’).”  148
Nāgeśa [in his Uddyota]:  
“‘All those who have articulate voice’ is not all inclusive, because of animals’ lack of articulate 
voice like that of humans and so on; hence he said ‘ye… [the passage starting at ‘those who are 
especially articulate,’ etc.]. In the [Patañjali] Mahābhāṣya, in the passage ‘yeṣāṃ vāci…akārā-
daya’ (= in whose voice the letters starting with ‘a’ are manifested), the meaning of ‘those who 
are articulate’ (=vyaktā) is of those in whose voice the whole range of letters starting with ‘a’ are 
articulated in a fully manifest form.”  149
Patañjali [expresses the opinion of a straw man to further his argument]: 
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“But these [roosters’] speech also manifests the letters starting with ‘a.’ And they are articulated 
because of the following reason: for, [people] say: ‘roosters say, <<cock-a-doodle-doo!>>’”  150
Nāgeśa:  151
“Regarding Patañjali’s commentary at ‘kukkuṭāḥ kukkuḍ,’  the word ‘say’ (=‘vadanti') needs to be 
added to the commentary. [In the next phrase,] ‘Thus people say’ is the logical construction of 
this sentence [thus people say that roosters say, ‘cock-a-doodle-doo.’]” 
Patañjali: [his retort to the straw man he set up earlier] 
“They say no such thing! This is an imitation of them [of what they say]. Or else, then, it would 
not be understood thus [in his analysis of Pāṇini’s compound]: ‘<<vyaktavāca>> are those beings 
whose voice is articulate.’ How is [the compound to be understood] then? ‘Vyaktavāca’ refers to 
those who in speech have phonemes that are articulate.   And thus we have the commentary ‘of 152
those whose voice is articulate.’” [Patañjali ends his commentary here.] 
Kaiyaṭa [comments]:  
“From ‘atha vā’ and on: even without ‘prakarṣagati’ (=‘what is meant is exceptionally’), basing 
on the word that establishes the case relationship in the bahuvrīhi [nominal compound], only 
humans are to be understood. From ‘vyatkā vāci’ and on, the meaning of ‘those whose letters are 
articulate’ is: those whose letters starting with ‘a’ are articulate. Parrots, mynahs, and so on do 
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 Here he only clarifies the passage, adding what is elided from the Sanskrit commentary.151
 Here I have translated varṇa differently from above because I think the implication is that “those who in their 152
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not innately have articulate speech whose range is all the letters, and moreover, the range of 
some of the letters is due to human effort; thus, in this case, there is no [use of] ātmanepada.” 
Nāgeśa:  
“As regards the word ‘vāc’ (=speech), the irregular first position of the word ‘vyakta’ [in the 
compound vyaktavācām] is according to the ‘niṣṭha’ (=past passive participle) [type of placement 
in compounds.]” 
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Appendix C  153!
Sanskrit original of Pāṇini sūtra 1.3.48 commentary by Patañjali with the sub-commentaries of 
Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa !
vyaktavācāṃ samuccāraṇe ||  48 || !
vyaktavākpadārthanirṇayādhikaraṇam  !
(ākṣepabhāṣyam) 
vyaktavācāmiti kimartham ? ||  !
(samādhānabhāṣyam)   
‘varatanu saṃpravadanti  kukkuṭāḥ ||’ 154!
(samādhāṇabādhakabhāṣyam) 
vyaktavācāmityucyamānepyatra prāpnoti  |   
ete’ pi hi vyaktavācaḥ || ātaśca vyaktavācaḥ | kukkuṭenodite ucyate  —  kukkuṭo vadatīti || !
(samādhānasādhakabhāṣyam) 
evam tarhi ‘vyaktavācām’ ityucyate | sarva eva hi vyaktavācaḥ | tatra prakarṣagatirvijñāsyate  — 
sādhīyo ye vyaktavāca iti || ke ca sādhāyaḥ ? | yeṣāṃ vācyakārādayo varṇāḥ vyajyante  || na 155
caiteṣāṃ vācyakārādayo varṇā vyajyante || !
(Pradīpaḥ) [Kaiyaṭa] vyaktavācām || 48 || sarva eveti | ye vadavyarthasya kartāraḥ | vada vyak-
tāyāṃ vācīti pāthāditi bhāvaḥ | !
(Uddyotaḥ) [Nāgeśa] vyaktavācāṃ || 48 || manuṣyādivattiraścāṃ vyaktavāktvābhāvātsarve vyak-
tavāca ityasaṃgatam ata āha —ye iti || 
bhāṣye yeṣāṃ vācyakārādaya iti | yeṣāṃ vāci vaikharīrūpāyāmakārādayo varṇā vyajyante vyak-
tā bhavantītyarthaḥ || !
(samādhānabādhakabhāṣyam) !
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 The question arises because the same verbal root vad applies to both human speech and animal cries according to 154
the Dhātupāṭha. Both animals and humans have manifest, audible (vyakta) voice, but Patañjali is made uncomfort-
able by the grouping or possible confusion of animal speech with human speech, so he clarifies why this case can 
only apply to human voice and hence, determines that ātmanepada uses of sam+pra+vad are for human voice and 
parasmaipada for animals. 
 Vyakta is the past passive participle of verbal root vi+añj, expressed here in the passive as vyajyante.155
eteṣāmapi vācyakārādayo varṇā vyajyante || ātaśca vyajyante | evam hyāhuḥ kukkuṭāḥ kukūḍi-
ti  ||  156!
(Uddyotaḥ) kukkuṭāḥ kukkuḍiti bhāṣyasya vadantīti śeṣaḥ | evaṃ janā āhuḥ ityanvayaḥ || !
(samādhānasādhakabhāṣyam) 
naivaṃ te āhuḥ | anukaraṇametatteṣām || 
atha vā naivaṃ viśāyate — vyaktā vāgyeṣāṃ ta ime vyaktavāca iti || kathaṃ tarhi ? || vyaktā vāci 
varṇā yeṣāṃ ta ime vyaktavāca iti || vyaktavācām || 48 || !
(Pradīpaḥ) atha ceti | vināpi prakarṣagatyā vyadhikaraṇapadabahuvrīhyāzrayaṇānmanuṣyā eva 
gṛhyante || vyaktā vācīti | vāci akārādayo varṇā yeṣāṃ vyaktāsteṣāmityarthaḥ | śukasārikādīnāṃ 
na sarvavarṇaviṣayaṃ svābhāvikaṃ vyaktavāktvamapi tu puruṣaprayatnavaśena kati-
payavarṇaviṣayamiti tatrātmanepadābhāvaḥ || 48 !
(Uddyotaḥ) vāci śabde || niṣṭheti vyaktaśabdasya pūrvanipātaḥ || 48 !!
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 I suspect this is a typographical error in the Sanskrit print, since the passage below reads “kukkuḍ” as the ono156 -
matopoeia of rooster speech.
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